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ABSTRACT
Few studies examine whistle-blowing from an organization’s self-regulating perspective.
The LAPD is one of the few municipal agencies that offer its employees 8 or more
misconduct reporting avenues to choose from. Yet, despite this large number of
resources, many police officers have opted to file civil lawsuits rather than utilize internal
resources to resolve reports of specific types of misconduct. A total of 131 sergeants,
detectives, lieutenants, captains and commanders were surveyed in 2009 regarding their
likelihood of reporting specific types of organizational misconduct to any one of the
internal departmental resources provided. Findings revealed 65% of the police officers
were likely to report any 1 of 8 specific types of misconduct allegations to department
supervisors, as opposed to any of the more specialized internal investigative options.
Over 70% of the officers were likely to report sexual harassment, hostile work
environment allegations and receiving disparate treatment due to having a work related
disability, to their chain of command.
Lesser known specialized resources were reported as the least likely to be used.
Reasons reported by respondents for not using internal resource options included a lack
of trust or confidence in unknown resources, fear of backlash from peers, or that they
simply preferred a less time consuming investigative process.
The study also examined the perceived impacts associated with reporting
misconduct. Alienation or silent treatment by peers and harsh treatment by co-workers
were rated as the most likely impacts of reporting misconduct.
The high percentage of police officers who are willing to report misconduct
through the LAPD’s chain of command is significant in that it assures management that

xv

mid level supervisors may have the influential power needed to improve the internal
reporting misconduct complaints, enhance compliance with employment discrimination
laws, and lessen the incidents of employees preferring external options to report
misconduct.
Recommendations for enhancing LAPD resource options for employees include
limiting the number of resources for reports of employment discrimination to one
specialized unit, enhancing training for supervisors, periodic quality service audits of
reporting resources to determine their effectiveness, and external LAPD oversight of the
reporting and investigation of discrimination allegations.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY
Problem Statement
Police, fire and military professions are very unique in that they each “possess an
unparalleled need for loyalty, solidarity, and protection (Kingshot, Bailey, & Wolf, 2004;
Rothwell & Baldwin, 2007) given that they can be life threatening at any moment
whether working in a patrol or administrative assignment. Police officer training dictates,
particularly when assigned to patrol assignments that each officer must be able to count
on and in fact, depend on their partner’s dedicated response in every given moment of
every call in order to protect one another from harm. Without this level of trust in one’s
partner “being there” the chances of an officer becoming seriously injured or killed
significantly increases and daily work becomes an increasingly frightening and lifethreatening experience.
The fears related to whistle-blowing or reporting the wrong-doing of peers are as
real as they are common. In fact, the initial internal thoughts that emerge at the mere
thought of whistle-blowing against another officer can result in real and perceived acts of
peer isolation, marital problems, physical or emotional health (Miceli, Near, & Dworkin,
2008), career suicide (losing promotions or assignments), and even the possibility of
intentionally being put in harm’s way. And, it is because of these fears associated with
whistle-blowing that employees silence themselves from reporting misconduct (Lewis,
2002) and police officers are no different.
Fear of being isolated from other co-workers, losing promotional opportunities or
career suicide are two of several significant causes for conscious and maybe even
unconscious silencing on the part of employees who witness or experience organizational
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wrongdoing. Police officers are duty bound to immediately report (whistle-blow) any
illegal activity or deviance of policy and procedure committed by another employee to
his/her supervisor or be subjected to serious scrutiny and discipline. This duty to report
policy deviance or misconduct is usually enforced through the use of written policy and is
a way that for the agency to assure the public of its ability to police its own organization
effectively. Police agencies, like the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD), in their
attempts to lessen the probability of intentional silencing or unwritten code of silence,
offer employees a variety of misconduct reporting resources, many of which can be
summoned anonymously.
Police officers learn fairly quickly to unconditionally trust their brother and sister
officer for protection and back up assistance during life threatening situations. This
uniquely close relationship builds into a strong cohesive and protective bond among
officers (Henik, 2007; King, 2003). This relationship also has the propensity however, to
create an “us versus them” mindset that could over time become shrouded in a bond of
quid pro quo secrecy (watching each other at all cost) or code of silence. In order to
prevent relationships from becoming too protective to a point where protection extends
beyond physical safety to one of mutual protection from “them” (management and
outsiders), some agencies require officers to rotate partners and shifts periodically.
The purpose of this study is to examine the decision-making process used by
police officers for determining (a) where and how to report specific acts of employee
misconduct, (b) the perceived likelihood of utilizing one or more LAPD internal
reporting avenues for managing reports of employee misconduct, and (c) the actual
and/or perceived consequences of whistle-blowing experienced by employees, so as to
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assist managers in learning how to properly manage employee reports of misconduct
while simultaneously minimizing and/or deterring acts of retaliation against whistleblowers. This study particularly concentrated on the act and impact of reporting specific
types of wrongdoing or misconduct committed by officers with respect to gender/race
discrimination, hostile work environment, co-worker harassment, disability
discrimination and other internal acts of employment misconduct. By comparing the
various types of wrong-doing witnessed by officers it would prove beneficial to managers
seeking to understand the conditions that most often influence an employee’s decisionmaking process in reporting wrong-doing, the impact of such reporting to the employee
and organization, what type(s) of reported conduct has resulted in real or perceived
retaliatory conduct, and lastly, what reporting avenues yield the highest perceived
negative impact?
Significance of the Study
The term whistle-blower and the act of whistle-blowing in any context are often
viewed as a negative and risky activity. For many of us our first indoctrination about the
risks of whistle-blowing and loyalty conflicts begin in the childhood years. Consider the
messages young children receive at their first experience of informing (whistle-blowing)
on another child or adult for doing something wrong. Much too often, these complaints
are silenced by well-meaning or sometimes ill-meaning receivers of this information
(parents, teachers, and other peers) through the use of descriptive name-calling,
“teacher’s pet, tattle-tale, cry baby, snitch, or worse, rat fink,” to name a few. We also
grow up learning about “loyalty” by our family members who warn of not disclosing
family secrets, from our siblings and peers who swear us to silence with the sharing of

3

secrets, our school mates who cheat on exams, and many more. And, when we enter the
working world, employee loyalty to the organization and to our co-workers is not only
presumed but an “expression of bonding” (Johnson, 2003, p. 26).
The act of informing about wrongdoing or whistle-blowing is a process that can
result in the creation of a new and improved organization or cause its demise. Whistleblowers, whether they are viewed as corruption busters seeking to improve the
organization or “disloyal rats” with self-serving motives, surface in all types of industries
and organizations. Corporate whistle-blowing can result in a number of repercussions,
such as co-worker alienation, job loss, job status, or actually becoming the catalyst for the
organizations downfall. Consider, however, there are also consequences for the whistleblower who reports the wrongful actions of peers or supervisors who they must depend
upon for job security and personal safety because of the very nature of that profession.
The initial witnessing of wrongdoing, internal processing of ethical values,
decision to report the wrongdoing, up to eventual disclosure of the witnessed behavior is
a lengthy and most times unrewarding internal and external process (Dworkin & Baucus,
1998; Miceli & Near, 1992). How can an organization encourage the internal whistleblowing process while managing real fears about retaliation? Are internal reporting
resources effective in encouraging whistle-blowing while discouraging negative impacts
that may occur such as retaliation? I once heard an adage in response to the question of
racial equality, “…just because the ‘white only’ sign is off of the water fountain…does
not mean that racism does not exist” (unknown author). The same may hold true for
organizational directives and codes of conduct that exist on paper while the culture acts
on a different set of unwritten rules for behavior. Failure on the part of any organization
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to protect whistle-blowers from retaliation or retribution has far reaching affects. Court
settlements that have plagued both the City of Los Angeles and its police department in
the last 6 years demonstrate that juries are becoming more and more sympathetic to
whistle-blowers who are raising the topic of organizational retaliation.
In August 2000, Bradley C. Gage, Los Angeles attorney, spearheaded a classaction lawsuit representing 40 current and former Los Angeles Police Officers. The
officers alleged acts of retaliation, fostering, condoning, and participating in the existence
of an organizational code of silence that punishes those who report misconduct. The
officers complained of organizational forms of retaliation by way of forced transfers,
hostile treatment, and other adverse employment actions. Mr. Gage was quoted in the
Los Angeles Times as saying, “these good cops fear their own administration and
management more than the criminals on the street” (Lait & Glover, 2000, p. A1).
In December 2003, the Los Angeles City Council agreed to settle a $2 million
dollar lawsuit initiated by a Los Angeles Police Officer after he was allegedly retaliated
against for the reporting of excessive force he witnessed. During these same
proceedings, another $2 million dollars was awarded to an additional eight Los Angeles
Police Officers for similar typed lawsuits which claimed one or more egregious forms of
organizational retaliation for the reporting of internal wrongdoing. Ironically, when
interviewed by a Los Angeles Times Staff Writer at the conclusion of these jury awards,
then Police Chief Bernard Parks expressed his disappointment with the trend of
employees “who get in trouble and seek to use retaliation as a defense” (Garrison &
Glover, 2003, p. B1). Sadly, this type of management mindset has overtime become
ingrained in the organization’s culture at all levels of the organization. Whistle-blowing
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police officers are often viewed by peer level employees as self-serving and disloyal both
to the organization and their profession. Management level employees commonly view
whistle-blowers as being low performing malcontents with a personal axe to grind.
Regardless of perceived motives, the cost of whistle-blowing creates a rippling effect that
is very hard to recover from.
In June 2006, a Los Angeles Police Officer was awarded $225, 000 when he
alleged that his supervisors retaliated against him by reassigning him far from home in a
move that is known internally as a form of freeway therapy after reporting his peers for
falsifying racial data information required on traffic stop reports (McGeevy, 2006). In
October 2007, a female officer was awarded $1 million after she claimed that she was
demoted three levels down after reporting her superior officer for promoting other female
colleagues who had allegedly performed sexual favors for him (Kim, 2008a).
In November 2008, the Los Angeles City Council unanimously approved a $2.25
million settlement to a female Los Angeles Police officer who claimed she was retaliated
against by co-workers and supervisors when she reported egregious acts of sexual
misconduct. The officer claimed that peers and supervisors maintained a “good ole’ boy”
work climate that would have any female officer cringe with disdain. After reporting her
partners for sexually explicit sexual bantering, exposure of genitals, and being excluded
from training exercises and office meetings, the officer was denied a promotion and
falsely accused of misconduct (Kim, 2008b).
One week prior to this most recent award, a Los Angeles County Superior Court
awarded $3.6 million to a male Los Angeles Police officer who defended the female
officer listed in the above jury $2.25 jury award. The male officer claimed he was
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retaliated against by being transferred and demoted after he spoke up and corroborated
the fact that his female co-worker had been subjected to a pervasive sexually offensive
work environment created by other male co-workers (Kim, 2008a; Lin, 2008). Within
months of this settlement, a Los Angeles jury awarded $3.1 million to a Los Angeles
Police Officer who claimed he was retaliated against when he reported his supervisor for
embezzlement. The officer claimed he was verbally harassed, called a “rat” by peer
officers, and unjustly transferred to a less desirable job assignment (Kim, 2008b).
Purpose of the Study
The primary purpose of this study is to explore the act and impact of whistleblowing by police officers who report acts of organizational wrong-doing within the Los
Angeles Police Department. In light of the continued lawsuit settlements in favor of the
police officer plaintiffs who blew the whistle on what they perceived as organizational
wrong-doing on the LAPD in the past few years, it is evident that the public and police
officers are finally on the same sheet of music and are sending a strong message. The
LAPD cannot ignore or excuse the high cost of whistle-blowing and reported acts of
employee retaliation. A close examination as to why police officers are filing claims
outside of the organization while internal resolution avenues exist and how the
organization responds to reports of workplace wrong-doing was conducted to determine
the gravity and scope of the problem so that the organization can address and manage it
swiftly and properly.
The statements reportedly made by Chief Parks, past police officer whistleblowers, and Attorney Gage, coupled with increasingly large plaintiff awards, may be

7

indicative of an organization in need of a paradigm shift in how the act of whistleblowing is viewed and managed from within.
Research Questions
The following research questions guided this study in the determination of how
the act and process of whistle-blowing impacts police officer whistle-blowers, and
whether ineffective management of the reporting of wrongdoing is a contributing factor
in the internal whistle-blowing process.
1. What is the reported likelihood of using each of the established internal
misconduct reporting resources based on specific misconduct allegations?
2. Are there differences in the reported likelihood of using internal misconduct
reporting resources based on any specific acts of employee misconduct?
3. What are the expressed reasons given for any misconduct reporting resources that
are “Not Likely” to be used for reporting specific acts of employee misconduct?
4. What are the actual and/or perceived consequences of participating in the whistleblowing process?
Limitations of the Study
There are several limitations to this study (a) only one law enforcement
organization was studied; (b) the study only examined the sworn population of the
organization from the ranks of police officer, sergeant, detective, lieutenant, captain and
commander only; and (c) reports of organizational wrong doing will be limited to acts
that involve specifically selected acts of employee misconduct most commonly reported
externally by police officers.
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Whistle-blowing on the LAPD was explored solely from the sworn perspective,
largely in part because of the high number of police officers identified by the department
as being involved in what is described as protected activity: activities that include the
reporting of law or policy violations by way of grievance, formal investigative entity or
lawsuit. There is empirical evidence to suggest that a high number of police officers do
report peers for criminal wrongdoing such as corruption or abuse of power, for example.
Significance of the Study
This exploratory study examined current LAPD whistle-blowing procedures and
perceived impacts of reporting specific misconduct allegations to internal investigative
resources to determine the differences between the (a) act of whistle-blowing, (b)
intentional employee silence, (c) retaliation, and (d) organizational management of
internal employee misconduct reporting.
Whistle-blowing refers to the disclosure by organization members (former or
current) of illegal, immoral, or illegitimate practices under the control of their employers,
to persons or organizations that may be able to effect action” (Miceli & Near, 1985).
The punishment of whistle-blowers by way of organizational retaliation fosters a climate
of non-disclosure or code of silence and has a negative impact on society that places an
inordinate amount of trust in its police. The City of Los Angeles has settled over $34
million dollars in lawsuits initiated by Los Angeles Police Officer whistle-blowers.
These whistle-blowers claimed they were the victims of organizational and social
retaliation after they attempted to report their peers and/or supervisors for various types
of wrongdoing, specifically to other employees. A common theme that surfaces in all of
these cases is employee discrimination at a time when the Los Angeles Police
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Department is currently operating under a Federal Consent Decree due to complaints of
racial profiling (using race/ethnicity as a basis for police detention). Is this a coincidence,
an indication of a culture in need of change, or has management selectively turned a
blinds eye to the internal reporting of specific types of employee misconduct?
The information derived from this study would be useful in identifying the
impact of whistle-blowing so that effective management systems may be designed to
improve the internal whistle-blowing process, minimize and/or deter acts of workplace
retaliation and enhance workplace standards of conduct. It is also hoped that this study
will advance the body of knowledge in the areas of whistle-blowing, negative impact of
internally reporting misconduct, and ways to lessen the code of silence in the law
enforcement profession.
The Organization of LAPD
The Los Angeles Police Department also known as the LAPD, is the third largest
policing agency in the United States. There are only slightly over 9,000 sworn police
officers and over 3,000 civilian or administrative personnel providing police service to a
community that encompasses 467 square miles. The city has twelve community areas
representing approximately 3.9 million residents (as of 2004). The organization itself is
managed by a Chief of Police.
The LAPD is structured in a formal hierarchal manner; a closed system with
many layers of divisions, units and sections with many levels of specialized operations.
The bureaucratic and paramilitary models came about during those times in history when
a structure of command and control was needed to facilitate small divisions of specialized
work In a hierarchical organization power is distributed from the top down. The idea of
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the establishment of the bureaucratic model was first introduced by sociologist Weber
(1947) as a way of eliminating managerial abuses that often lead to inefficiency. Most of
the characteristics of a bureaucratic organization fit quite well in any law enforcement
organization, particularly with a well-defined hierarchy of authority, division of labor by
functional specialization and a strong system of rules for staff. The one drawback is that
it creates impersonal employee relationships, particularly between management and
members of the organization and strengthens relationships between assigned members of
smaller specialized units. These close bonds contribute to the development of ingroup/out-group dynamics, non-disclosure rules of conduct, and other forms of group
norms that have the appearance of solidarity where “…one of the most respected tenets of
the group is loyalty” (Johnson, 2005, p. 76).
Auten (1985) first introduced the paramilitary model of policing organizations.
Paramilitary organizations incorporate military-like characteristics. The very nature of
police work and critical incident operations calls for this type of sworn personnel
management and may not be as necessary or productive at all levels of the organization.
Paramilitary organizations closely resemble the bureaucratic organizational model with
the exception of the formulation of cultural police traditions such as badge ceremonies
that may last for the life of the organization, strict adherence to uniform dress and
appearance, a formal rank structure that is self-governing and a military terminology
unique to the particular organization. Similar to the bureaucratic model, interpersonal
creativity, and impersonal relationships are for the most part not supported or encouraged
by the top down leadership.
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There are four geographic bureaus dividing the City of Los Angeles into 21
geographical divisions. There is one deputy chief for each geographical division with
one or more commanders as “direct reports” who have functional supervision over the
commanding officers (captain rank) of each patrol division. Each division is run by two
commanding officers of captain rank, three lieutenants (watch commanders) one per shift
and at least one sergeant for every ten officers assigned to work each shift. Each division
has both a patrol division and a detective division. There are approximately 200 officers
assigned to each division. Within this massively large structured organization are a
number of specialized functions such as: scientific investigations, jail operations,
property retention and booking operations, narcotics enforcement units, vice enforcement
units, administrative operations, specialized detective units and criminal investigations
and field law enforcement, to name a few.
Terms and Concepts
There are a number of key terms referenced in this study that will be defined to
allow for a common understanding as to how they will be used in this study followed by
a brief summary of what is currently known about these concepts.
•

Organization: An organization is an open system of interconnected and
interrelated parts (culture, physical and social cultures, technology) working in
relationship to the external environment.

•

Paramilitary (operational) Organizational Structure: An organization which
models a military form of authority and control over employees with formal rank
and file structure and top down decision-making with order givers and order
takers.
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•

Sworn Employee: An employee having police officer status and powers of arrest.

•

Rank -Civil service classification and pay-grades: The order of rank in the
Department, as established by the Civil Service Commission.
(LAPD Manual, 2009, Section 2/026)

•

Pay-grade: The order of rank and pay-grade in the LAPD is as follows:
•

Chief of Police (COP).

•

Deputy Chief II (Asst Chief).

•

Deputy Chief I (Dep Chf).

•

Commander (Cmdr).

•

Captain III (Capt. III).

•

Captain II (Capt. II).

•

Captain I (Capt. I).

•

Lieutenant II (Lt. II).

•

Lieutenant I (Lt. I).

•

Detective III (Det. III).

•

Sergeant II (Sgt. II)

•

Sergeant I (Sgt. I)/Detective II (Det. II).

•

Detective I (Det. I).

•

Police Officer III+1 (PO III+1).

•

Police Officer III (PO III).

•

Police Officer II (PO II).

•

Police Officer I (PO I).
(LAPD Manual, 2009, Section 2/025, 2/026)
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•

Department Supervisor- An employee engaged in field supervision or in general
supervision of a section or unit.

•

Watch Commander- An employee having charge of a specific watch in a division
or geographic Area.

•

Commanding Officer- An employee in charge of a bureau, a group, an Area, or a
division of the Department

•

Staff Officer- An officer above the rank of captain.
(LAPD Manual, 2009, Section 3/105)

•

Chain of Command: Clearly defined lines of authority between each employee
and the Chief of Police.
(LAPD Manual, 2009, Section 1/650)

•

Misconduct (employee): Commitment of a criminal offence, neglect of duty,
violation of department policy, rules, and/or procedures, conduct which may
reflect unfavorably upon the employee or department.
(LAPD Manual, 2009, Section 3/805.25)

•

Retaliation: Unjustified adverse employment action taken against an employee
due to his/her participation in a lawfully protected activity, as either a reporting
party or witness.
(LAPD Manual, 2009, Section 1/272)

•

Code of Silence: A spoken and unspoken assurance or agreement among
members of an organization to protect one another at all cost as an expression of
loyalty, cohesion, and solidarity.
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Summary of Theoretical Concepts
Studies of what constitutes the act of whistle-blowing, loyalty, the creation and
impact of an organizational code of silence, and the impact of organizational retaliation,
have all been studied from a variety of vantage points over the years. A review of the
academic literature suggests that organization development theories referencing
employee loyalty to the organization remained steadfast in the 1950s through the middle
1970s beginning with the “organizational man” theory with respect to employees whose
expressed loyalty was to the organization and its purpose as being undivided and absolute
(Lawrence, 1991; Leavitt, 1965; Nader, Petkas, & Blackwell, 1972). The idea of loyalty
conflicts began to surface in the middle 1970s when organizational theorists began to
proclaim that employees in a free society should not be obligated or forced to restrict
their personal loyalty to any one institution (Kerr, 1964).
The act of whistle-blowing is not a new phenomenon. What is new, however, is
how organizations and society as a whole have shifted the view and treatment of the
organizational whistle-blower. Research about whistle-blowing has largely focused on
several influencing factors: (a) organizational factors such as the structure, culture, and
climate, codes of conduct (Barnet & Cochran, 1992; Decker & Calo, 2007; Dozier &
Miceli, 1985; Dworkin & Baucus, 1998; Miceli & Near, 1985); (b) the individual
whistle-blower, in terms of personality characteristics, values, belief systems, moral and
ethical judgment development (Barnett & Cochran, 1992; Kolaska & Aldrich, 1980;
Miceli & Near, 1988; Rothchild & Miethe, 1999); (c) loyalty conflicts (De Maria, 2008;
Gundlach, Douglas, & Martinko, 2003; Hacker, 1978, Mesmer-Magnus & Viswesvaran,
2005), and (d) situational causations, such as the seriousness of the wrongdoing, position
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and influence of the whistle-blower within the organization, and ambiguity about real or
perceived wrongdoing (Jos, Tompkins, & Hays, 1989; Keenan, 1995; Miceli & Near,
1984; Near, Dworkin, & Miceli, 1993).
While there is no manual entitled the Code of Silence in any organization, there
are behaviors found in closed organizations where restrictive information sharing and
intentional non-disclosure of police activities (including misconduct reporting) becomes a
suspected activity to those outside of the organization. Many academic studies suggest
that hierarchal organizational structures may by virtue of established compartmentalized
groupings and strict lines of communication mechanisms restrain free upward
communication (Glauser, 1984), and that fear of isolation by co-workers limits even the
communication of viewpoints (Morrison & Milliken, 2003). Studies conducted by
Festinger in the 1950s, for example, showed that structuring groups into hierarchies
automatically stifles communication flow by virtue of the many levels of subordinate and
supervisory relationships (Milliken, Morrison, & Hewlin, 2003; Morrison & Milliken,
2000). In closed systems that are self-governing with respect to personnel policies and
procedures and closed to outsiders, such as police, fire and military, formal, and informal
norms develop an esprit de corps that is of a very protective nature (Rothwell & Baldwin,
2007; Skolnick, 2002).
Informing on one another ruins this family-like institution (Chin & Wells, 1998)
making it extremely difficult for the whistle-blower to recover from in terms of social and
organizational acceptance. The possibility of being outcast from or retaliated by his/her
fellow officers is exemplified in an officer’s intentional decision to not disclose the
wrongdoing of the organization or a peer, even if the wrongdoing is committed to
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him/her directly (Skolnick & Fyfe, 1993). It is this type of conscious non-disclosure of
information, of wrongdoing or employee misconduct, that is perceived by the public as a
Code of Silence doctrine.
Retaliation is a form of “personal vendetta” against another. Studies have shown
that there is a propensity for whistle-blowers to suffer the wrath of organizational
retaliation by way of adverse employment actions as a vendetta for taking part in
disclosing wrongdoing and expression of disloyalty (Ewin, 1990; Rothwell & Baldwin,
2007). There is also evidence to suggest that whistle-blowers also receive harsh conduct
from peers in the form of social retaliation for breaking the “thin blue line” by snitching
on a brother or sister officer.
Summary
This research examines the act and impact of whistle-blowing by police officers,
organizational whistle-blower management structures, and reported incidents of
organizational and social retaliation which is reported to have followed the whistleblowing process. Whistle-blowing and the psychological and social impact of the
whistle-blowing process has been researched and studied since the 1960s. Organizational
response to whistle-blowers, the implications of subsequent backlash and other forms of
social and organizational retaliation which often follows alongside the whistle-blowing
process has not been studied with the same amount of vigilance as the research behind
whistle-blower characteristics, intent, loyalty, and other values-based variables. Most
importantly, few studies have captured data from one specific law enforcement agency
that has been the subject of such high monetary court settlements and monetary awards to
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employees who chose to blow the whistle on their organization outside of the
organization, rather than seek internal resolution.
This quantitative study examined those variables that may influence the whistleblowing process and/or an employee’s refusal to report wrongdoing. Quantitative
methods of inquiry included a survey instrument that was disseminated to sworn
department personnel using a random selection process stratified by gender in order to
capture representatives of each rank. Related theories, department policies and directives
will also be compared and contrasted with City, State and Federal whistle-blowing and
retaliation laws.
By understanding the reasons why employees chose to report specific acts of
organizational wrongdoing outside of the organization rather than internally,
organizations can assess their current policies and procedures, and address obstacles that
prevent the reporting and investigations of these issues. The training of employees and
management personnel would also be positively impacted by utilizing this information to
assess current supervisory training and leadership development to determine whether
there is a valid structure in place to affectively address the perception of loyalty conflicts,
code of silence, and fear of whistle-blowing as well as incidents of workplace retaliation.
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CHAPTER II: REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
Introduction
Since the 1950s, the act and impact of organizational whistle-blowing has been
studied from several vantage points: organization environmental factors, the individual
personality and belief systems of the whistle-blower, and situational or types and
seriousness of the disclosures being made.
Few studies, however, concentrate on the act or impact of disclosing wrongdoing
within the organization and/or outside of the organization from the perspective of police
officers who have historically held onto traditional mindsets of protecting one another
and the organization as a whole from negative public scrutiny or embarrassment through
the use and misuse of silence. To effectively examine the act and impact of whistleblowing within the LAPD, this study began with an extensive literature review which
focused on the makings of a paramilitary organization; its structure and culture, and the
environmental factors that may influence the act and decision-making process leading to
the disclosure or nondisclosure of organizational wrongdoing.
A major element of the decision-making process for the police officer as whistleblower is the internal processing of loyalty conflicts and the unwritten expectation of
protection of the organization by way of intentional silence. Literature into the causes,
effects, and impact of employee silence will be summarized to determine how intentional
silence influences the whistle-blowing process.
A number of municipal, state and federal laws protecting whistle-blowers have
been enacted over the years to protect the whistle-blower who disclosed types of
organizational wrongdoing that has direct implications for public policy. Examples of
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such disclosures include wrongdoing in the medical profession, pharmaceutical industry,
environmental protection, and securities fraud, to name a few. However, if municipal,
state, and federal laws are designed to protect those who disclose organizational
wrongdoing that directly affects public policy, who protects the organizational whistleblower from organization reprisal when the wrongdoing affects one individual or small
group of individuals? Examples of these types of wrongdoing include violations of laws
pertaining to sexual harassment, race, sexual orientation, and other forms of
discrimination.
Absent protection from the organization, the whistle-blower is left to wonder
about the consequences of his or her actions once co-workers and supervisors discover
that there is a “rat in their midst.” Is organizational reprisal or retaliation an automatic
impact of whistle-blowing? And, if so, how can the organization protect the whistleblower from harm’s way so as not to influence unnecessary and costly court litigation for
failing to take appropriate action? Is employee harassment and other forms of
discriminatory wrongdoing in the mind and eyes of the beholder, or can wrongdoing be
clearly defined? For the purpose of this study, the standard used for identifying
organizational wrongdoing will be the LAPD’s definition of employee misconduct. The
Los Angeles Police Department Manual (LAPD, 2009) defines misconduct and violations
of misconduct as follows:
Employees shall be subject to disciplinary action for acts of misconduct.
Misconduct is defined as:
•

Commission of criminal offense

•

Neglect of duty
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•

Violation(s) of Department policies, rules, or procedures

•

Conduct which may tend to reflect unfavorably upon the employee or the
Department
(LAPD, 2009, Section 3/805.25)

The LAPD is no stranger to having dirty laundry aired to the public by police
officers who have used a variety of external reporting entities to report wrongdoing that
had a direct and most times negative impact on the public they serve. Some of these
types of wrongdoing include the over use of physical force, selective enforcement of the
law based upon race, gender, lifestyle differences, and other discriminatory acts related
to law enforcement. Once reported, the organization has the responsibility of conducting
a thorough and unbiased investigation of each and every allegation of misconduct
whether made by the public or from within its ranks. The internal decision-making
process for police officers who opt to disclose real, rumored, or perceived misconduct is
an extremely difficult one, despite organizational policies that require the immediate
internal reporting of such conduct by employees lest they too suffer the wrath of
condoning the misconduct and be held equally liable for disciplinary action that could
ultimately lead to termination.
The literature review for this study focused primarily on those aspects of
organization theory that provide a background for understanding paramilitary and/or
police organizational structure, police culture development and socialization, whistleblowing and the impacts of whistle-blowing from the perspective of the whistle-blowing
police officer, and the organization from various stages of the reporting processes.
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Organization Theory
The Los Angeles Police Department, also known as the LAPD, has historically
been controlled by Chiefs of Police with strong inflexible top-down management. As
head of the organization, the Chief of Police has the most significant influence over the
everyday actions and quality of work life of organization members. The effectiveness of
patrol officers and detectives is evaluated daily not only by the organization but by the
public they serve. The effectiveness and efficiency of the organization is evaluated by
many factors such as, the number of criminal suspects identified and arrested, response
time to emergency calls, number of citizen complaints and commendations, lowered
incidence of crime (violent or otherwise), increase or decrease of recovered property and
other examples of evaluating productivity.
In hierarchal subcultures, as in paramilitary organizations, there is a distinct
emphasis on the separation of management levels or rank structure (Auten, 1985). On the
surface, uniformed officers and administrative personnel appear to work well as a team.
However, the organizational unity that appears synergistic to those outside of the
organization is actually fragmented by several distinct subcultures: sworn and civilian,
upper management (staff officers) and middle management, supervisory and subordinate
personnel. Civilian and sworn personnel have experienced a history of tense
relationships on the LAPD. Sworn personnel are often described by civilians as being
robotic, aloof, and arrogant and demanding when addressing civilian personnel.
Civilian personnel are often stereotyped by sworn personnel as being mere
clerical staff, despite the many civil service rankings represented on the department that
has a number of civilians actually outrank sworn personnel. A large number of civilian
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personnel historically report feeling de-valued and unappreciated by the sworn members
of the department. Despite these vocalized or internalized differences, the rising number
of LAPD corruption scandals and civil lawsuit awards, the department continues to police
itself despite historic attempts to deflect external oversight monitoring. Organizational
culture can have an enormous impact on organizational performance. The more separate
these sub-cultures become, the easier it becomes to resolve loyalty conflicts by way of
rationalization, blame, and avoidance.
The Five Circles Model
Hatch (1997) theorized in her book, Organization Theory that an organization is
made up of the interrelationships of identified segments, which overlay and sometimes
interpenetrate one another. She designed what she termed as the Five Circles Model
which depicts five spheres each labeled as culture, social structure, technology, and
physical structure all contained within a larger circle entitled environment. Hatch’s
model suggests that each of these spheres or segments of the organization are contained
in one or more of the other segments and that they interrelate with the organization’s
environment (Hatch). Using Hatch’s conceptual Five Circles Model as a basis for
describing the organizational design of the Los Angeles Police Department would
provide for a clearer understanding and analysis of the organization.
Culture
The culture of an organization consists of the norms, values, and beliefs that are
taught and shared by the members of the organization (Schein, 2004). The culture can be
viewed and analyzed from two distinct vantage points. At the forefront are the obvious
physical settings, slogans, and traditional ceremonies, manner of dress and interpersonal
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behaviors. What are not as obvious are the underlying beliefs, values, and behaviors that
occur when only members of that particular culture can see. Sometimes the behaviors
exhibited by members of organizational subcultures have little to no affect on the
organization’s mission. Then, there are those behaviors that can undermine what the
organization wants to accomplish.
One of the department’s most influential police chief who reined in the 1950s,
believed that the LAPD should be run in a military fashion because he believed that the
police were “living, physical symbols of authority…warriors who battled to save an
indifferent world” (Cannon, 1997, p. 72). And, for the most part, the department culture
as a whole has unfortunately maintained this similar warrior mentality even today as
evidenced by the continuous lawsuits initiated by and settled on behalf of community
members for the use and overuse of police physical tactics over the years.
Organizational culture reflects the history of the organization; the symbols and
rituals created and nurtured by a group of people that are sometimes difficult to change.
In his book, Good to Great, author Jim Collins wrote about the culture of discipline and
the importance of putting the right people in the right jobs supporting the right values and
focusing on those activities that fit the organization. It is in these leadership actions that
allow people to move the organization in the right direction because the right people are
motivated (Collins, 2000). The LAPD is no stranger to the concept of control and
discipline to manage the behavior of its members. Changing times, however, call for
changes in personnel control mechanisms that tend to cultivate a culture of silence for
fear of being outcast by the organization, its members, and the public.
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The LAPD is structured within the confines of a top down formal bureaucratic
culture. Employees are governed by a 500 page Department Manual that describes work,
dress, interpersonal relationships, law enforcement procedures, proper execution of
various administrative duties, and other department related expectations. Each member is
expected to follow this manual to the letter and can be disciplined for any portion that is
not adhered to. The discipline policy for misconduct or conduct unbecoming of any
employee who causes the embarrassment of the organization is strictly and has
unfortunately, been held to task by members of the organization and its police union for
selective enforcement of discipline depending on the rank and/or position of the accused
employee.
From the moment a police recruit officer graduates from their eight months of
police academy training he or she is assigned to a training officer for twelve months for
the practical application and testing of what they have learned while in the academy-with
a slight exception. Most, if not all, recruits have expressed stories about training officers
who are quick to school their trainee with statements that are often the subject of
controversy. Examples of such advisements are to “forget what you just finished
learning… I’ll teach you the real way to do police work or, what is said in this car stays
in this car…” Many will say that this is the moment of a new officer’s first socialization
or indoctrination into the real culture of the police environment where there are written
and unwritten rules or norms of conduct (Conti, 2009; Johnson, 2005). This is not to
suggest that new police officers are all taught a wrong or inappropriate way of doing
police work. However, it is a common tactic used by more tenured officers to socialize
young police academy graduates into the us versus them culture; a culture that often
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becomes interpreted as the real world where cops put their lives on the line for one
another and as such must “watch each other’s back” so as to be free of public and
department management scrutiny (Conti, 2009).
According to social psychologist Schein (2002), there are at least three types of
responses to this type of socialization, (a) rebellion, (b) creative individualism and, (c)
conformity. Civilian personnel-the second half of this organization are not similarly
indoctrinated into the social norms of the police culture. This lack of indoctrination or
equal treatment causes an immediate wedge that breeds mistrust, and animosity between
two distinct segments of the organization. Creative individualism may be the most
common response to working in an environment where authority and control leave
minimal room for positive forms of creativity.
Social and Physical Structure
The social and physical structures of an organization are very important when
analyzing the behaviors of its members because the physical structure of an organization
influences group, individual, and organizational identity in both positive and negative
ways. For example, employees who report to work from day to day in less than desirable
conditions where the physical work environment is un-kept, desks, phones and other
necessary items are broken, stained or in short demand may have a negative effect on the
employee’s pride in where he or she works. Low employee pride eventually has a
domino effect on lowering professionalism and productivity. The reverse is often true
when the organizational structure and everything in it demonstrates organizational pride.
The culture of an organization has been defined as, “….any social unit that has
some kind of shared history…with the strength of that culture dependent on the length of
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its existence, stability of membership and the emotional intensity of the actual historical
experiences…” (Schein, 2004, p.11). According to Schein, the true essences of culture
are the established norms, beliefs, and assumptions that are at the core of their existence.
A social structure refers to the relationships between people and the
organizational departments they work in while the physical structure refers to the
organizational layout-how offices and units are designed, geography, and design of office
furniture and equipment (Daft, 2004).
Technology
Technology represents the methods used by the organization to produce goods or
service. This could be anything from tools, uniforms, and equipment used to conduct
business to a method to produce a particular output (Daft, 2004).
Organizational Design
Within the established literature surrounding the topic of organizational design
there were several 19th Century designs that closely resemble the working structure of
paramilitary organizations today. Ironically, these theoretical concepts created for
maintaining the well oiled factories of the Industrial Age remain active and almost
nurtured by paramilitary organizations, like the LAPD as if these were the only methods
for sustaining successful organizational goals.
Here is a description of those theories in common with a paramilitary
organization particularly when it comes to efficiency, organizational functioning, and
authority, and control.
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Efficiency
In the 1900s, Taylor (1911) with his Scientific Management Theory theorized that
decisions about organizations and job design should be based on the precise scientific
study of individual situations through the close supervision of employees doing
specialized work and motivating workers with rewards and threats of punishment,
including loss of employment. Taylor’s theory introduced strong arguments for
management control over employees since at the time of its design workers were viewed
as selectively doing work to allow for more workers to be hired. Taylor also designed
incentives for workers-a method for increasing productivity. In fact, if Taylor were
running a police department today he would probably be using information technology to
insure that officers and supervisors were targeting enforcement activities in the right
direction (Daft, 2004). Today, police officers are evaluated by numbers: the number of
citations and reports written, number of arrests made by personal observations of criminal
activity as compared to radio call response, number of calls handled and the time it took
to respond to those calls, and other numerical comparisons of lesser importance. This
method of evaluation for determining an officer’s effectiveness can either work as a
reward for good work or a counseling session for the necessity of improved performance.
To a select few, it translates as selective acknowledgment based on favoritism and bias;
another reason to “take care of each other.”
Organizational Functioning
In 1917, Fayol (as cited in Daft, 2004) with his Administrative Principles looked
at the design of organizations by introducing fourteen principles of management as a
means for looking at the function of the organization as a whole, not just the workers on
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the assembly line as with Fayol. Two principles in particular continue to be utilized in
bureaucratic organizations today with the LAPD as no exception: Unity of Command and
Unity of Direction. Unity of Command suggests that subordinates should only take
direction from one supervisor. Unity of Direction suggests that similar activities
conducted within an organization should be grouped under one manager’s control (Fayol,
as cited in Daft, 2004).
Clearly Defined Authority and Control
The bureaucratic framework of organizations was created out of the need to help
organizations maintain maximum efficiency in operations and is also known as the
classical perspective. The desire to have a well oiled functioning organization came
about with the classic model of sociologist Max Weber in 1947. Daft (2004) identified
several characteristics that he theorized would be found in a successful bureaucracy.
1. Rules and Procedures
2. Specialization and division of labor
3. Hierarchy of authority
4. Technically qualified personnel
5. Separate position and incumbent
6. Written communications and records
The LAPD continues to manage its operations using principles and theories that were
much more effective within the timeframe and society structure they were designed in
than they are today. The changing society and workforce demographics demonstrate a
significant need for ongoing organizational change in all industries both public and
private. All of the LAPD rules and procedures are codified in a department manual that
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is distributed to all employees and their receiving this document is acknowledged with
signatures that are filed away only to resurface when those policies are not appropriately
followed. By definition, employee misconduct can be a rude comment as well as a
violation of criminal law. How this definition is applied varies from supervisor to
supervisor.
In a study conducted on the LAPD’s command and control system, the
Independent Commission on the Los Angeles Police Department (Christopher
Commission), appointed by Los Angeles Mayor Tom Bradley in 1991 and headed by the
U.S. Secretary of State, Warren Christopher, described the LAPD’s system as “outdated.”
It went on to say that this type of system not only fails to broaden the goals of crime
prevention, it “…fostered the retaliation machinery, and alienated rank and file as well as
the public” (Independent Commission on the Los Angeles Police Department
[Christopher Commission], 1991). Attempts to overturn, question, or dismiss orders and
other management decisions are often viewed as acts of insubordination and are
considered threatening to the orderly procedures required to operate (Glazer & Glazer,
1989) in an efficient manner.
Sub-culture separation, the application of discipline, selection of personnel for
specialized training and assignments, evaluating work performance, and other workplace
actions fall under close scrutiny by all members of the organization, not just supervisors
and upper command staff. News of special treatment given to command staff or
supervisory personnel when misconduct is reported travels through the organization
within a 24-hour period. To a select few, the message translates to separate sets of rules
and an environment riddled with favoritism and selective enforcement of the rules; a
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perfect breeding ground for the unwritten code to “watch each other’s back…stick
together…what goes on in this car stays in this car.” Police officers perceive the LAPD
discipline system “as an arbitrary, demeaning system of entrapments that burns
whistleblowers, fails to stop big abuses” of power (Chemerinsky, 2001, p. 566), yet
“prosecutes officers for ‘micro-infractions’” (p. 566); a system designed to treat officers
like “targets of control” (p. 575) where silence is employed to protect officers from the
discipline system that is viewed as “petty and unfair” (p. 575).
There are two characteristics of the police culture that are more pervasive than
others are: isolation and solidarity. Policing can be a highly stressful, scrutinized, and
secretive profession. Officers police the community with an inordinate degree of power
and authority. Separation and isolation from the community, a strict and unforgiving
internal discipline system that demands the immediate reporting of misconduct through a
relentless chain of command, and the inherent dangers of police work, leads officers to
stick together (Kleinig, 1996; Wright, 1999) and may also contribute to organizational
silencing or an unwritten code of silence. In this environment, the reporting of
wrongdoing by the organization is viewed as an act of self serving disloyalty whether the
wrongdoing is reported through internal channels or reported to an external resource.
The police culture can be as distrusting internally within their own community as they are
of the outside (community): a closed culture that easily mirrors a dysfunctional family
system when they begin to abuse and emotionally cannibalize their own employees in the
guise of maintaining tradition, silence (keeping dirty laundry at home), and blind loyalty.
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Code of Silence
The code of silence as an intentional silencing of the reporting of misconduct or
wrong-doing, is not a new phenomenon. Other professions such as the medical and
judicial industries have been known to intentionally withhold information that would
cause the embarrassment, discipline, or termination of individuals or complete
organizations. However, police silencing, also known as the blue code or the code of
silence, seems to get the most attention from the community when it involves law
enforcement officers who cover up, refuse to disclose, or testify against a fellow officer
for violations of criminal misconduct. The covering up of administrative misconduct
falls within the scope of internal investigative entities, which monitor the organization
from within for the maintenance of professional standards and adherence to departmental
policies and procedures. LAPD Manual sections will be used in this study to qualify
what will be referenced as misconduct. Studies into the code of silence indicate that this
phenomenon may be an “embedded feature of police culture” that has potentially
corrosive and destructive elements (Kleinig, 2001; Skolnick, 2002). Surveys distributed
to police officers indicate that this intentional silencing occurs in all ranks and in all
departments and that many officers chose not to report misconduct for fear of what my
happen to them or what may not happen to the person they report on (Trautman, 2001).
Several studies have been conducted on the LAPD following large organizational
scandals such as the infamous Rampart Scandal where a Rampart Division gang
enforcement officer implicated 70 officers for illegal conduct ranging from shootings,
bribery, and perjury after he himself was implicated (see Independent Review Panel,
2000; LAPD, 2000; Reese, 2002). This reported activity resulted in over $90 million s in
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civil court settlements. Studies consistently reveal that the culture of silence on the
LAPD has not been properly addressed (see Chemerinsky, 2001; Independent
Commission on the Los Angeles Police Department, 1991; Independent Review Panel,
2000; Rothwell & Baldwin, 2007). This may be because it is so engrained in the culture
of the LAPD that few accept this concept as a true fact when in fact there has been
testimony given by two top LAPD officials who provided testimony to the Christopher
Commission in 1991 indicating that the culture of LAPD needed serious reform. These
high ranking officials were blasted by then Chief Darryl Gates for having “sold out the
department” (Chemerinsky, 2001, p. 562). They “sold out” the department by admitting
the LAPD needed reform. If high ranking officials are viewed this way, what is to be
said of the lower ranks of the organization when they come forward?
Studies conducted on police agencies from throughout the United States indicate
that the majority of police officers would not report incidents of misconduct that were
viewed as being minor in nature (see U.S. Merit Systems Protection Board, 1993; 2008).
Criminal actions committed by police officers; however, were more likely to be reported
and viewed more serious than administrative infractions which are viewed as minor acts
of misconduct that do not warrant disclosure (Westmarland, 2005). If the perceived
seriousness of the misconduct is a strong determinant of whether an officer would report
the wrongdoing or not, this may be an indicator of why victim police officers of internal
violations of laws or organizational policies relating to discrimination or harassment are
more unlikely to report or blow the whistle on these types of misconduct. The decision to
internally report misconduct is a difficult process for police officers. They face fears that
can range from not being believed to being ostracized and/or socially removed from the
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close work environment they considered as close or closer to their own family. In August
2000 a total of 40 LAPD officers filed a class action lawsuit against the LAPD for
enforcing a code of silence and in allowing management the power of retaliating against
those who came forward with misconduct (Lait & Glover, 2000). This significant
number of officers is very telling in and of itself.
Whistle-Blowing
The act of whistle-blowing is not a new phenomenon. Research into the topic of
whistle-blowing has largely focused on several influencing factors: (a) organizational
factors such as the structure, culture and climate, codes of conduct (Miceli & Near,
1985); (b) the individual whistle-blower, in terms of personality characteristics, values,
belief systems, moral and ethical judgment development (Chiu, 2003; Miceli & Near,
1988; Rothchild & Miethe, 1999); (c) situational causations, such as the seriousness of
the wrongdoing, position and influence of the whistle-blower within the organization; and
(d) ambiguity about real or perceived wrongdoing (Keenan, 2000, Miceli & Near, 1984).
In the 1980s the act of whistle-blowing began to be studied from sociological and
psychological perspectives to identify what organizational conditions most affected the
growing incidents of employee dissent. Was it authority structure, lines of
communication, top down decision-making processes, or a combination of all? And, in
what way do these organizational processes affect what appeared to be a growing
dilemma of conflicting loyalties and employee dissent (Anderson, Perrucci, Schendel, &
Trachtman, 1980; Stewart, 1980). The affects of whistle-blowing once studied from a
narrow organizational perspective began to focus primarily on the characteristics and
identification of the typical whistle-blower in the middle to late 1980s. Many studies

34

focused on whether whistle-blowers be identified by a shared belief system and/or do
organizational ethical climates influence the likelihood of their willingness to blow the
whistle on their organization (Miceli & Near, 1984).
As organizational theories shifted with respect to the act and propensity for
whistle-blowing so did the definitions of what the term whistle-blowing actually meant.
The term whistle-blowing comes from the combination of the words blow and whistle.
The common analogy of using a whistle to stop a train is similarly used to describe the
act of whistle-blowing; implying that someone is blowing the whistle on a person or
organization to stop something from happening (Miceli & Near, 1985). According to
Craige and Hubert (as cited in Vandekercklove, 2006); however, the word blow was
actually a slang term used in 1839 to describe the act of informing while the symbolic use
of the word whistle may have been derived from as far back as 1599 when the term was
used to describe an informer (Simpson & Weiner, 1989).
There is some uniformity in how the term whistle-blower is used and referenced
as a form of behavior as in the “act” of whistle-blowing. What is somewhat conflicting is
how the various theorists describe a whistle-blower and the conditions that lay the
foundation for whistle-blowing to occur. For example, in 1972, the whistle-blower and
act of whistle-blowing was described as a man or woman who blew the whistle on an
organization for acts he/she believed were corrupt, illegal, fraudulent, or harmful to the
public interest (Nader et al., 1972). The 1970s symbolized change from absolute loyalty
to an organization to social resistance to organizational authority. It stands to reason why
this particular definition was quite clear in referencing organizational corruption as being
harmful to public interest and therefore deserving of the proverbial whistle being blown
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outside of the organization. In 1995, the definition was expanded somewhat to include
internal whistle-blowing as a valid qualifier to describe the act of whistle-blowing
(Chiasson, Johnson, & Byington, 1995).
Whistle-blowing was described by an organizational theorist as being a socially
useful act of informing; a deliberate non-obligatory act of disclosure made by a person
with access to data who reports any wrongdoing to an external entity who has the
potential to rectify the wrongdoing. In his book, Vandekerckhove (2006) noted that the
act of whistle-blowing was described by Jubb (1999) as having six elements in the
whistle-blowing process: an action, an outcome, an actor, the subject, the target (of the
wrong-doing), and the recipient. He also recognized the element of motive (De Maria,
1994) as a seventh element of the whistle-blowing process.
When the wrongdoing is reported to an entity or person within the organization,
the whistle-blowing is described as being an internal reporting process. When the
wrong-doing is reported to persons or entities outside of the organization, such as the
media or by way of a civil lawsuit, the whistle-blowing is considered an external
reporting process (Hoffman, 2001).
There does not appear to be any uniformity as to whether the act of reportable
wrongdoing through the organization’s outlined internal reporting structure constitutes
whistle-blowing or whether the whistle-blower must report the wrongdoing through an
entity that is outside of the organization to be considered a true whistle-blower.
Chiaisson et al. (1995) opine that internal disclosure does qualify as whistle-blowing
while Miceli and Near (1992) claim there is an important distinction to be made between
internal and external disclosure of wrong-doing because in their studies on whistle-
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blowing internal disclosure commonly precedes external disclosure. This distinction is
important because there are State and Federal statutes that specifically protect whistleblowers from retaliation when they use internal channels such as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
(SOX), and others who are protected when reporting to external channels.
What is also unclear in academic literature is whether an internal reporting source
within an organization in a position to rectify the wrong-doing can equally be viewed as a
whistle-blower if the reporting whistle-blower is referred to external resources for
resolving the organizational wrong-doing being reported. According to Vandekerckhove
(2006), internal disclosure (of wrongdoing) can follow conventional hierarchical lines of
authority or they can thwart those lines. Interestingly, the literature suggests that both
internal and external whistle-blowers tend to view their organizations as unsupportive
and having less than effective avenues for resolving complaints of wrong-doing (Near,
Rehg, Van Scotter & Miceli, 2004; Rehg, Miceli, Near, & Van Scotter, 2004). An
organization that provides adequate responses to internal reports of wrongdoing must be
recognized as a key factor in avoiding external reporting (Andrews, 2006; Miceli & Near,
1994).
Paramilitary organizations, not unlike many other public corporations where a
good reputation equates to efficiency, the reporting of wrongdoing whether externally or
internally is viewed as an act of being disloyal to the organization and at times, the
profession itself. In a sense, the whistle-blower becomes the “enemy within” (Davis,
1989, p. 8). When organizations respond negatively, ineffectively, or completely fail to
respond to reports of organizational wrongdoing, these responses break relationships of
trust between the whistle-blower and the organization. They create loyalty conflicts that
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cause future whistle-blowers to remain silent or seek resolution outside of the
organization for a more acceptable recourse of action (Larmer, 1992; Sims & Keenan,
1998; Varelius, 2008; Zhang, Chiu, & Li-Qun, 2009).
Stages of the Whistle-Blowing Process
A “typical” whistle-blowing process that occurs one exact way under an exact set
of circumstances has not been and may not ever be established. The act of whistleblowing is not an exact science. Each whistle-blower utilizes his or her individual
decision-making process or way of internally processing how, when and to whom any
real or perceived wrongdoing should be reported. Prior personal experience or the
rumored experiences of other whistle-blowers also contribute to what if anything may be
reported within the organization, particularly if the experience was a negative one.
The act of whistle-blowing appears to follow an individualistic decision-making process
that goes through a number of stages (Miceli & Near, 1992).
According Miceli and Near (1992), there are very distinct stages that are involved
in the whistle-blowing process with each stage having a number of distinct
characteristics: (a) individual characteristics that affect his or her approach to the whistleblowing issue; (b) the situation, content, and process of the issue, (c) the organization
involved in the reported wrongdoing; (d) the relative power of the parties over one
another; and (e) assessment of the outcome. Studies conducted by Miceli and Near
(1984, 1985), indicate that following a reportable event (stage one), there are at least five
stages in the whistle-blowing process. Figure 1 illustrates the five stages of the whistleblowing process as it would function on the LAPD. The five stages are
1. The triggering event
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2. The pre whistle-blowing decision of who and where to report
3. The decision to report or not report the event
4. Members of whistle-blowers work group and organization reactions if and
when they are aware of the complaint and identity of whistle-blower
5. Whistle-blower assessment of the outcome of reported issue

Triggering Event

Pre -whistle -blowing
decision

Specific Type of
Misconduct is
witnessed or
experienced
Stage 1

Where do I go?

The Decision to report

Internal reporting options:
• Supervisor
•Commanding Officer
•Internal Affairs Group
•Employee Relations Group
•Work Environment Liaison
Division
•Office of the Inspector
General
•Retaliation Prevention Unit
•Behavioral Science Services

(Cost/benefit analysis)

External reporting options:
•City of Los Angeles
resources
•Federal and/or State of
California options
• Civil Lawsuit
Stage 2

Stage 3

yes

no

Reactions
from within

Reporting
process
refused

Workgroup
Management
Supervisors
Wrongdoer’s
Management
Stage 4

Whistle -blower
continues to be
monitored for
retaliation prevention
Whistle -blower re considers returning
to stage 2

Resolved

Not
Resolved

Whistle -blower assesses
outcome of complaint or
concern

Department entity
notifies Retaliation
prevention unit for
employment action
monitoring

Stage 5

Figure 1. Reporting misconduct on the Los Angeles Police Department within the fivestage whistle-blowing process.
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Consequences and Impact of Whistle-blowing Process
How the organization and its members respond to a whistle-blowing event
varies. Much of the research into the consequences and impact of whistle-blowing from
the organizations perspective indicate that there are both short term and long term
responses to whistle-blowing whether the disclosure is made internally or externally.
From an organizational perspective, in the short term the wrongdoing may discontinue
immediately or it may continue on as if nothing were reported.
Either of these actions in the long term can result in a change in organizational
policy. From the whistle-blowers perspective, the short term effects can be the
experiencing of organizational retaliation (at all levels), or no response to the disclosure.
In the long term, there may be continuous negative organizational outcomes such as
adverse employment actions or the experience of backlash, ostracism or being put in
harms way by affected or unaffected co-workers who band together to avenge the breach
of disloyalty. Loyalty, according to the Encyclopedic Dictionary of Business Ethics, is
the “willingness to sacrifice…” (Axinn, 1977, pp. 388-389).
Loyalty and Intrinsic Controls
Another way of looking at this form of sacrifice is to understand that to be loyal
more closely means to be “true to one’s obligations” (Vandekercklove, 2006). The
question is how one defines his or her highest obligation (Kolaska & Aldrith, 1980).
New York Patrolman Frank Serpico was true to his highest obligation: his profession
when he refused to be a part of receiving bribes from citizens and criminals in the middle
1960s (Reese, 2002). Yet, others from within the same organization classified him as a
disloyal “rat” who took away everyone’s livelihood after he disclosed their corrupt deeds.
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They were police officers who took the same oath of office as Serpico. Where did their
initial loyalties lie and what caused this transformation from protection of the public to
taking from the public?
Intrinsic controls are used in the police culture to produce conformity without the
need for the confines of strict rules and regulations. The idea is to produce voluntary
conformity by instilling in each officer a common intrinsic belief system of pride and
professionalism with the demand for organizational unity, and loyalty to the law
enforcement profession thereby doing away for the need of constant monitoring.
“Loyalty is a significant element of intrinsic control” (Reese, 2002, p. 107). There are
formal intrinsic controls given by the establishment of authority and control mechanism
and there are informal intrinsic controls set by the unwritten rules of small groups within
the organization.
In 1969, New York Police Officer Frank Serpico learned about such intrinsic
control mechanisms fairly quickly when he joined a police department that was riddled
with racism, graft and many other forms of corruption. He had such a respect for the law
enforcement profession that he was quickly socialized into the department’s social
structure. In time however he learned about the informal social intrinsic cultural norms
of acceptance of bribes, evidence tampering and other criminal cover-ups involving a
large segment of the police department. He resisted these informal intrinsic controls and
it almost cost him his life. Officer Serpico went to great lengths to report the misconduct
internally and then externally to the media. Changes were made many years later.
Indictments were served to over half of the personnel from all levels of the organization.
Just weeks after receiving a hero’s thank you, Frank Serpico responded to a planned drug
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raid and was shot in the face at point blank range while his partners turned a blind eye.
Serpico retired from the force with a disability pension (Glaser & Glaser, 1989; Reese,
2002). If there was one question to be asked of Officer Serpico it would be this, was it all
worth it?
Whistle-blowing is motivated by a variety of personal interests. While one
whistle-blower may claim the overarching goal of betterment of the organization, another
may seek to avenge the wrongs he or she may have experienced or witnessed as a
significant breach of organizational trust (Callahan & Collins, 1992; Cortina & Magley,
2003; De Maria, 2008; Sims, 1998). While many superiors look at whistle-blowing as a
form of personal revenge, retaliation is a part of a rational and planned process initiated
by an organization to destroy the resister’s credibility as a witness (Parmerlee, Near, &
Jensen, 1982).
Retaliation
Retaliation or “getting even” has been identified as one of several impacts related
to the whistle-blowing process. The reporting of organizational retaliatory practices are
not always met with welcome arms. In fact, retaliation has almost become an expected
outcome of reporting organizational misconduct (Beard, 2007; Benoit & Nagle, 2003;
Yaffe, 2007). Retaliation can range from coercion by organizational members to
withdraw a complaint or not participate in a criminal or administrative investigation
involving another employee to outright exclusion from the organization with behaviors,
such as isolation, character assassination or defamation, elimination of job position,
demotions, transfers, and other forms of harassment and/or discrimination (Cancino &
Enriquez, 2004; Near & Miceli, 1986, 2008; Parmerlee et al., 1982). Studies have shown
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that supervisors who retaliate often do so to avenge their reported or suspected inability
to maintain order and control within their places of assignment (O’Day, 1974; Patel,
2003; Schreiber & Marshall, 2006; Sheeder, 2006). Other members of the organization
view outside disclosures of wrongdoing as a breach of organizational loyalty; the acts of
disgruntled troublemakers who have done nothing more than embarrass the leadership of
the LAPD. Rather than allow outsiders to question the decision making policies of an
organization most managers quickly attack the whistle-blowers credibility, particularly if
the charges are serious, in hope of diverting unwanted questions (Alford, 2007;
Anderson, 2009; Glazer & Glazer, 1989).
Many researchers have studied levels of retaliation to determine whether specific
actions taken by the whistle-blower may have influenced various forms of retaliation, if
the channel chosen to report the wrongdoing influenced the type of retaliation received,
or if the disclosure of the identity of the whistle-blower caused any forms of retaliatory
behaviors (Birk, 2006; Miceli & Near, 1984, 1992,1994, 2002; Near & Miceli, 1986;
Parmerlee et al., 1982). Their conclusions vary. In fact, very few of these studies
included research into the impact caused to the organization when the disclosure of
wrongdoing is made by a police officer from within the rank and file who did not leave
the organization after being reportedly retaliated against, as in the case of Frank Serpico.
Studies have been conducted with police officers and their decision to remain silent in
lieu of reporting misconduct and the variables that influenced their decisions to report or
not report (Olson-Buchanan & Boswell, 2002). Past studies have shown that few
resisters are prepared for what follows their reports of wrongdoing. While many whistleblowers claim that their “principles commanded their loyalty far more strongly than did

43

management” managers continue to view the actions of whistle-blowers as an act of
disloyal undermining. Whistle-blowers are viewed by management as having involved
themselves in “actions against the very bureaucratic hierarchy that hired them and
provided good salaries” within a highly respected profession (Glazer & Glazer, 1989).
Studies have shown that management has taken a number of steps to silent the
whistle-blower from further organizational embarrassment. Some of these steps include
blacklisting, transfers to positions outside of their normal expertise or assigned tasks well
below their level of competence, demoted, or harassed by co-workers and supervisors,
“which far exceed the ostensible provocation” (Glazer & Glazer, 1989, p. 134).
Indications of these whistle-blowing impacts appear to be loud and clear on the LAPD.
The Office of the Inspector General was designed as a means to end the suspected code
of silence by allowing officers to speak to another independent resource for reporting
wrongdoing under strict confidentiality and protection from reprisal. In their report of the
Rampart Scandal, it was noted that LAPD had revealed confidentially that they had
received reprisals from the department and supervisors after reporting wrongdoing. They
reported being branded as “disloyal”, being transferred to less desirable assignments and
often to less convenient distances from home; also known as “freeway therapy”
(Chemerinsky, 2001, p. 545).
It is the intent of this study to explore whistle-blower actions and the actual or
perceived retaliation negative consequences reported by police officers who work on the
LAPD in hopes of advancing current studies involving the act and impact of whistleblowing and improve on current policies and procedures for recognizing and improving
behaviors associated with perceived retaliation following the reporting of wrongdoing.
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Managers, particularly in police organizations, often ask whether employee perceptions
absent hard facts, should be given equal investigative attention as employees who report
quantifiable adverse employment actions. A recent report completed by the U.S. Merit
Systems Protection Board (MSPB) in 2008 addressed this common concern after
conducting a report on 25 years of perspectives of the Merit Principles Survey:
Perceptions matter, because negative perceptions-even when unwarranted- can
seriously undermine morale, organizational performance, and the credibility and
effectiveness of even well-intentioned, well-conceived management initiatives. (p.
55)
The Board of Inquiry Report (Los Angeles Police Department, 2000) on the
LAPD indicated there was no need to do a cultural overhaul of the LAPD after a study
was completed on the LAPD’s use of force following the Rodney King incident in 1991
when he was beat by three LAPD officers while 11 others watched. They concluded that
the removal of a few rotten apples and stamping out organizational mediocrity were
sufficient to maintain order on the LAPD (Chemerinsky, 2001). To this, I quote authors
Skolnick and Fyfe (1993) who said:
It is far easier for police chiefs to blame misconduct on individual “rotten apples”
than to admit they have (a culture)…that systematically turns new members into
wrongdoers…lasting reform is not imposed by the personal charisma of a single
chief…or by replacing wrongdoers with fresh blood. (p. 186)
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Legal Approaches to Whistle-Blowing
State and Federal Laws
The focus of federal and state laws having to do with whistle-blowing has
predominantly been the protection of employee whistle-blowers from organizational
retaliation and to compensate them when it has been proven legally that they have
suffered adverse employment actions as a direct result of their whistle-blowing. Since
retaliation is not an automatic response in all whistle-blowing case, the fears associated
with possible retaliation absent evidence of adverse employment decisions or actions that
inhibit the employee’s ability to function at work and/or home stress free is virtually
detectable without substantiated proof. The whistle-blower is protected by law only after
the retaliation occurs (Miceli & Near, 1992). Life threatening fears experienced by
police officers can be a huge deterrent to disclosing any form of misconduct or whistleblowing. The effectiveness of the internal reporting system in place currently could either
encourage or discourage disclosure of wrongdoing. Current laws are viewed as
ineffective in correcting and preventing organizational misconduct (Miceli & Near).
Several of the most common federal and state statutes relating to whistle-blowers
will now be summarized.
Federal
The federal government’s goal in enacting legislation protecting whistle-blowers
was to reduce federal fraud, waste, and abuse by encouraging the reporting of
wrongdoing. Whistle-blower protection statutes began to surface in the 1980s.
The National Labor Relations Act of 1935. The National Labor Relations Act
protects employees’ rights to engage in protected concerted activities with or without a
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union. The act also attempts to improve working conditions, such as wages and benefits
(National Labor Relations Act, 1935).
The Civil Service Reform Act of 1978. The Civil Service Reform Act prohibited
retaliation against any Federal employee who disclosed illegal or wasteful activities
(Civil Service Reform Act, 1978). The act also established the U.S. Merit Systems
Protection Board (MSPB), which conducts periodic studies of the federal civil service
system and reports to the President and Congress about the progress of the protections in
place for prohibited personnel practices. The MSPB has conducted several studies of
whistle-blowing and retaliation through the use of anonymous survey instruments.
False Claims Act of 1863 (revised in 1986). One of the most popular whistleblower statutes is the False Claims Act of 1863 and revised in 1986 makes recoveries for
victims of retaliation much more generous and easier to obtain. Under this act, the
whistle-blower files a qui tam (Latin phrase meaning “he who sues for the king as well as
for himself”) suit on behalf of the government (Miceli & Near, 1992, p. 247). The Justice
Department can either join the suit or not. If they join the suite and the case is successful,
the whistle-blower receives up to 25% of the judgment. If the government does not join
and the case is successful, the whistle-blower receives 30% of the judgment (Federal
False Claims Act, 1986).
Whistle-Blower Protection Act of 1989. The Whistle-blower Protection Act was
passed by congress in 1989 to strengthen the protections for whistle-blowers by
improving the appeals process (Whistle-Blower Protection Act, 1989).
Notification and Federal Anti-Discrimination Act of 2002. On May 15, 2002,
President Bush signed legislation called the NO FEAR Act (Notification and Federal
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Anti-Discrimination Act, 2002) to improve agency accountability for antidiscrimination
and whistle-blower laws. The law requires employers to be notified of their rights under
discrimination laws and the Whistle-blower Protection Act. This law holds federal
agencies accountable for violations of antidiscrimination and whistle-blower protection
laws.
Civil Rights Act of 1964 (revised in 2006). In 2006 the Supreme Court lowered
the threshold for proving adverse employment actions in retaliation claims under Title
VII (Civil Rights Act, 1964). Title VII prohibits employment discrimination based on
race, color, religion, sex or national origin, and any action by an employer that could
dissuade a reasonable worker form making or supporting a charge of discrimination
(Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway Co. V. White, 1962).
State of California
California Government Code 12940. The California Government Code 12940(h)
in the California Fair Employment and Housing Act of 1980 in the makes it unlawful for
an employer, or person to discriminate against any person because he/she opposed
practices forbidden under Section 12940(j) (1). The employer and individuals who
pursue such harassment or retaliation (such as threatening to take disciplinary action
against employees who have filed claims of discrimination, harassment or retaliation may
be held personally liable under California Government Code Section 12940(j) (3).
California Labor Code Section 232.5. The California Labor Code Section 232.5
makes it unlawful for an employer to discharge, formally discipline, or otherwise
discriminate against an employee who discloses information about the employer’s
working conditions.
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California Labor Code Section 1102.5. The California Labor Code Section
1102.5 protects employees who refuse to participate in an activity that would result in a
violation of a state or federal statue, or noncompliance with a state or federal rule or
regulation. An employer may not retaliate against an employee for disclosing
information to a government or law enforcement agency, where the employee has
reasonable cause to believe that the information discloses a violation of state or federal
statute, or a violation of noncompliance with a state or federal rule or regulation
(California Department of Industrial Relations, 2010).
City of Los Angeles
Los Angeles City Employees
The Los Angeles City Ethics Commission was established in 1990. The City
Charter has mandated that the Commission maintain a 24-hour Whistle-blower Hotline so
that City employees can anonymously report alleged violations of City laws under the
Commission’s jurisdiction without fear of retaliation from supervisors or other
individuals (Los Angeles City Ethics Commission Newsletter, 2006).
Los Angeles Municipal Code, Section 49.5.4 protects city employees from
retaliation such as suspension, termination, demotion, an unfair increase in workload, or
transfer to another office so far that the commute presents a hardship for the individual,
and any other form of discriminatory conduct in retaliation for a subordinate filing a
whistle-blower complaint (City of Los Angeles, 2010).
Los Angeles Police Officers
With respect to police officers, there are specific Administrative Codes,
Government Codes, Memorandum of Understanding, Civil Service Codes, and the Police
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Officers Bill of Rights, which all govern the terms and conditions of employment
specifically for public service employees. The following codes will be briefly
summarized in relation to police officer grievances with respect to administrative
transfers, and re-assignments to a lowered pay-grade. These types of grievances are the
most common reasons for retaliation claims made by police officers.
The Memorandum of Understanding (MOU). The MOU between the City of Los
Angeles, LAPD, and Los Angeles Protective League governs the terms and conditions of
employment actions made with respect to LAPD police officers of the rank of lieutenant
and below. According to Article 1.8(8) of the MOU, the Chief of Police has the authority
to transfer and Assign members of the department as needed. Transfers may not be
grieved and are not subject to arbitration regardless of the reason for the transfer. Article
8.1(a) of the MOU defines a grievance as a dispute concerning the interpretation or
application of the MOU or department rules and regulations governing personnel
practices or working conditions (Los Angeles Police Protective League, 2009).
The Los Angeles Administrative Code. The Los Angeles Administrative Code also
provides that employees may not raise grievances about the consequences of
management decisions on wage, hours and other terms and conditions of employment
(Los Angeles Charter and Administrative Code, 1969-2010).
The Los Angeles Police Department Manual. The LAPD Manual, Section 763.55,
provides the circumstances when re-assignment to a lower pay-grade is warranted and
indicates that an officer who has clearly demonstrated his/her failure to satisfactorily
perform the duties of his/her current position may be re-assigned. The officer is given
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30-days to respond before the paperwork is submitted to the Employee Relations Group
commanding officer for review and approval (LAPD, 2009).
LAPD Internal Investigative Resources
There are a number of internal investigative resources within the LAPD that have
a specific duty to manage, refer or outsource, and/or investigate any allegation of
misconduct, including allegations of retaliation. Department employees may meet with
any one or more of these entities for the purpose of bringing misconduct to the attention
of department. (LAPD, 2009):
1. Any department supervisor
Any department supervisor, sworn or civilian may initiate a formal personnel
complaint reporting, refer to another investigative entity, or conduct a formal
investigation.
2. Internal Affairs Group
Internal Affairs Group is made up of investigators skilled in the investigation of
personnel complaint investigations initiated by employees or the public. Upon
notification of a personnel complaint against the department, or another
department employee, the receiver of this investigation will document the
complaint and a Complaint File number will be assigned in order to tract the
complaint to fruition.
3. Work Environment Liaison Division
Assigned WELD personnel are skilled in alternative dispute resolutions that
include mediation, conciliation and or referrals to other investigative resources.
Should a formal personnel complaint investigation be deemed necessary, WELD
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personnel will forward the employee’s interview information to the appropriate
investigative entity or to the employee’s commanding officer for review and
action. Typical cases involve hostile treatment by co-workers and supervisors and
other inter-personal conflicts.
4. Employee Relations Group
The entity is responsible for managing grievances filed by department personnel
that are related to employment actions. Wage, hour, shift assignments and
transfers are typical grievances filed by personnel.
5. Behavioral Science Services
Department psychologists are provided with strict levels of confidentiality
privileges. Absent a claim of harm to self or others, child, elder or other abuse
violations that must be reported, department psychologists have doctor/patient
privileges of non-disclosure.
6. Peer Support Personnel
Peer Support Personnel are trained department personnel who voluntarily assist
employees who are in personal or professional crisis and need of referral
resources.
7.

Office of the Inspector General
Appointed by the Los Angeles Police Commission to monitor the activities of the
LAPD and may assist in the resolution of reported wrongdoing.

8.

Los Angeles Police Protective League
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LAPD union representatives voted into office by LAPD members. Union
representatives may assist members in resolving reported employment concerns
or complaints by meeting with involved department commanding officers.
9.

Retaliation Prevention Unit, Risk Management Group
Unit assigned to monitor employment actions taken against employees who are
involved in protected activity to ensure there is no evidence of retaliation.
Summary
For the purpose of this study, the act of whistle-blowing has been defined as, a

process utilized by an individual employee or group of individuals who decide or
conspire to inform about real or perceived organizational wrongdoing to an entity within
the organization or outside of the organization. The organization studied as we explore
the act and impact of whistle-blowing is the LAPD. The sources of the whistle-blowers
are the police officer employees of the LAPD. There have been a number of empirical
studies having to do with the act of whistle-blowing. The impact or consequences of
whistle-blowing to the organization being reported or to the individual whistle-blower
have yielded mixed results. Like an open wound, whistle-blowing can be effective when
the disclosure results in needed change to the infected organization. Conversely, the act
of whistle-blowing can also be used to purposefully hurt the organization when the
disclosure is only intended to be a self-serving act of vengeance, retribution, or scapegoating rather than generating needed change. When used for these purposes, whistleblowing can still impact the organization in a positive way from the outside in through
media, outside organizations or by public demand.
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Police officers are socialized into their profession differently than most other
professions. There is a need for unity of command and unity of loyalty to the profession
in order to continue to protect and serve the community with utmost professionalism and
integrity. To maintain this level of loyalty it is vitally important that we understand
breaches of loyalty by putting systems in place to identify organizational wrongdoing by
encouraging and even rewarding internal whistle-blowing. An officer’s highest level of
loyalty is to his or her profession; the badge he or she wears every day is the symbol of
trust imposed upon them by the public.
The next level of loyalty is to the specific law enforcement organization they are
employed by. Should that level of loyalty be breached by ineffective, illegal, unethical or
immoral methods of supervision, the decision to right that wrongdoing becomes a process
that is an individual sacrifice of self? Once the decision is made to blow the whistle
internally, the organization that fails to act or that acts inappropriately sets the stage for
the external disclosure of wrongdoing. It is at this moment that the organization stands
on trial by the public and its members for the proper resolution of reported wrongdoings.
The LAPD has historically managed strict reporting policies for reporting
misconduct. Policies exist to clearly define employment discrimination and harassment,
zero tolerance for retaliatory behavior and other forms of code of conduct violations.
There are at least eight independent internal investigative or personnel guidance
resources at the disposal of department personnel for the reporting of misconduct or other
types of organizational wrongdoing. Yet, lawsuits filed by a number of Los Angeles
Police Officers tell the real truth of the matter. There is a flaw in the management of
employee misconduct and possibly a need for a cultural overhaul.
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This study intended to identify whether the whistle-blowing process is negatively
impacted by current internal reporting avenues, and whether the current internal reporting
structures in place influence the whistle-blower to report or not report organizational
wrong-doing internally. It is hoped that the results of this research would assist in the
design or maintenance of effective management control systems for improving the
organization while protecting and when appropriate rewarding the whistle-blower as a
change agent rather than a disloyal dissenter.
By understanding how organizational factors may influence employees to report
or prevent others from reporting wrongdoing, management may be able to examine and
possibly modify existing practices to address obstacles and more effectively manage and
encourage internal whistle-blowing.
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CHAPTER III: RESEARCH METHOD
This study explored the act and impact of whistle-blowing from the perspective of
sworn police officers who are employed by the LAPD. The study specifically examined
the decision-making process used by police officers for determining the likelihood of
utilizing existing LAPD internal resources to report specific acts of employee
misconduct, and the real or perceived consequences of whistle-blowing as imagined or
experienced by employees. To guide this study, the following research questions were
developed.
1. What is the reported likelihood of using each of the established internal
misconduct reporting resources based on specific misconduct allegations?
2. Are there differences in the reported likelihood of using internal misconduct
reporting resources based on any specific acts of employee misconduct?
3. What are the expressed reasons given for any misconduct reporting resources that
are “Not Likely” to be used for reporting specific acts of employee misconduct?
4. What are the perceived consequences of participating in the whistle-blowing
process?
Research Design
The research was guided by an exploratory descriptive design using a selfadministered survey instrument. Quantitative data was collected via the survey
instrument with a small amount of additional qualitative data. Subjects were asked to
report the likelihood (Highly Likely”, “Likely”, or “Not Likely”) of using internal
avenues available to police officers for reporting specific types of misconduct, and
whether or not influential factors in terms of specific experiences with a given resource or
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perceived impact of reporting might influence their decision to report or not report
specific allegations of misconduct.
Advantages of Self-Administered Surveys
Self-administered surveys are said to be a preferred method of choice when
managing sensitive information within specialized or professional groups (Edwards,
1997). The advantage of using the self-administered survey for this research was the
ability of providing survey participants with a higher level confidentiality for the
information they would provide because it was not necessary for them to disclose their
personal identity. These types of surveys also allow the participants the flexibility of
completing them when and where it is most convenient.
Disadvantage of Self-Administered Surveys
One disadvantage of a self-administered survey is that it is a labor intensive
process to manage and control. This disadvantage proved true for this study. The LAPD
mailroom was unprepared to handle the large volume (N = 740) of survey envelopes
which lent itself to an unplanned and unexpected delay of surveys being sent to
recipients. Additionally, because the survey instrument did not ask the respondent to
include his or her name on the document, it was not possible for the researcher to collect
identity information for sending another survey, or to record the name or rank of who did
not return surveys for possible follow-up procedures.
Sources of Data
Target Group
The sources of data for this study are actively employed sworn police officers
who are members of the LAPD holding the rank or civil service classification of Police
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Officers II and III, Sergeants I and II, Detectives I, II and III, Lieutenants I and II,
Captains I, II, and III, and Commander. Table 1 describes the population by rank and
gender.
Table 1
Los Angeles Police Department Personnel Totals by Rank and Gender
Rank

# Males

# Females

Total

Commander

15

2

17

Captain

64

16

80

Lieutenant

226

53

279

Detective

1289

488

1777

Sergeant

1087

196

1283

Police officers

3992

958

4950

Totals

6673

1713

8386

Human Participants Consideration
This study sought to specifically examine, evaluate, and possibly modify specific
department services provided to all LAPD employees by having survey participants
anonymously identify their willingness to use organizational reporting avenues without
having to disclose any information related to their specific identity, gender, ethnicity,
rank, or job assignment.
This study deals with the employee disclosure of very sensitive information that
pertains to employee misconduct on the LAPD. Confidentiality and anonymity is of
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utmost concern when protecting human subjects and it was the intent of this researcher to
take very specific precautions to ensure that all participants remain protected from
identity disclosure. All participants were assured by the researcher in writing of the noncoercive nature of the study and that all responses would remain confidential, derived
anonymously, and maintained and reviewed only by this researcher.
Pepperdine University’s Institutional Review Board (IRB) determined that the
study met the exemption requirements under the federal regulations Category (2) of 45
CFR 46.101 and agreed to waive the requirement of a signed consent form since the
study involved survey procedures that do not identify any of the human subjects involved
in the study (see Appendix A).
It is typical for researchers to obtain organizational approval to conduct surveys,
regardless of whether the researchers are members of the organization being surveyed.
Organizational approval gatekeepers are typically from top management, unions and
institutional review boards (Edwards, Thomas, Rosenfeld, & Booth-Kewley, 1997). This
researcher is a tenured sworn detective employed by the LAPD. It is the expressed
written policy of the LAPD that any internal survey being considered for employee
participation must go through a strict organizational review process that begins with the
researcher’s chain of command.
The LAPD procedural manual (2009) states, in part:
The Employee Relations Administrator shall review and evaluate any request
for approval to use an employee survey. The Employee Relations
Administrator shall approve or disapprove the request and shall ensure that the
following criteria are met:
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1. The employee survey is not in conflict with the right of employee
organizations to represent the interests of their members.
2. The employee survey is appropriate in content and methodology.
3. The employee survey would benefit the Department and/or law
enforcement.
(Section 3/220.55)
Formal approval was provided through the researcher’s immediate supervisor,
Bureau Commanding Officer, and the Department’s Employee Relations Administrator.
The Employee Relations Administrator issued the researcher a signed LAPD
Intradepartmental Correspondence (LAPD, Form 15.2) indicating that formal approval
was granted (Appendix B). After receiving appropriate departmental approvals, the
researcher met with the union representing the police officers of the LAPD, the Los
Angeles Police Protective League (LAPPL) to assure them that the rights, anonymity, and
confidentiality of the participants and any information being provided was not in
violation with any established Memorandum of Understanding between the rank and file
and department. The researcher met with a representative of the LAPPL, Legal Counsel
who reviewed the survey instrument and determined that the scope and purpose of this
study fell within legal guidelines. Formal approval was provided to the researcher in
writing by the LAPPL Legal Counsel (Appendix C).
Data Collection Strategy and Procedures
The Survey Instrument
Self-administered survey instruments have a high degree of anonymity and
confidentiality for surveys containing sensitive items (Edwards et al., 1997). The survey
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instrument for this study was designed in two parts. Part one of the survey included a
listing of the eight most common forms of employee misconduct allegations reported by
LAPD employees between the years 2005 and 2009. The first portion of the survey was
designed to determine the employee’s likelihood of reporting or not reporting specific
misconduct allegations through the use of eight established LAPD organizational
reporting avenues.
The eight specific misconduct allegations reported by police officers and were
extracted by the researcher from civil litigation Causes of Action filed in civil court by
LAPD employee plaintiffs between January 2005 and June 2009. Table 2 illustrates the
type of misconduct violations and the resource options provided to LAPD employees for
the reporting of employee misconduct.
Table 2
Specific Misconduct Types and LAPD Reporting Avenues
Specific Misconduct Type

Departmental Reporting Avenues

Sexual harassment in the workplace

Any Department Supervisor (below the
rank of Captain)

Hostile, offensive, or intimidating work
environment because of race or gender

Any Command or Staff Officer (Captain
or above)

Disparate treatment following a work-related
disability

Internal Affairs Group

Non-selection for promotion or pay-grade
advancement because of race or gender

Employee Relations Section

Being subjected to gender or racially biased
comments at work

Work Environment Liaison Division

A personality conflict with a supervisor that was
negatively impacting him/her

Office of the Inspector General

Being denied a hardship change of watch or
assignment because of race or gender

Retaliation Prevention Unit

Being denied a specialized training opportunity
or assignment because of race or gender

Behavioral Science Services
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In Part One, respondents were asked to refer to each of the eight misconduct
allegations and to check whether they would: Highly Likely, Likely, or Not Likely use
when contemplating the use of each internal LAPD reporting resource listed should that
listed type of behavior be personally experienced by him or her in the workplace. A
comment section followed each section of the listed allegations. Respondents were asked
to comment as to why any particular resource would “Not Likely” to be used by the
respondent to report employee misconduct.
Part Two of the survey contained a series of questions designed to measure the
actual and/or perceived impact or consequences of whistle-blowing whether they have
participated in the act of whistle-blowing or not. Using the eight most common forms of
employee misconduct, respondents were asked to refer to each allegation and then
indicate the type of impact they would perceive receiving should they report any of the
listed allegations through established LAPD reporting avenues. Table 3 illustrates the
most commonly reported types of impact listed by employee plaintiffs of civil lawsuits.
Respondents were also provided with a choice of “satisfactory resolution” should they
not perceive any negative consequences for reporting misconduct. As in Part One, each
question was followed by a comment section so that respondents were able to indicate
another type of real or perceived impact not listed within the group of choices provided.
The last item of the survey allowed respondents to provide suggestions or
recommendations for improving existing internal reporting avenues for employees.
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Table 3
Reported Types of Impact for Reporting Specific Types of Misconduct
Impact of reporting misconduct
Alienation or silent treatment from co-workers
Harsh treatment by co-workers
Involuntary transfer of assignment
Demotion or downgrade in rank
Lowered performance evaluation
Assigned to a job location far from home (freeway therapy)
Assigned to demeaning job tasks or assignment
Satisfactory resolution

Survey Validity and Reliability
Content Validity
To determine the content validity of the survey instrument, the researcher
assembled an expert panel of three certified LAPD Police Performance Auditors who are
assigned to the LAPD’s Audit Division. Audit Division personnel are responsible for
conducting internal audits of various types of police performance actions for management
review. Panel members were asked to evaluate the survey instrument and determine the
need for modifications to the surveys verbiage, question clarity, length, overall lay-out
and, if deemed necessary, provide additional suggestions for meeting the objectives of
this study. The auditors each agreed that the contents of the survey appeared to meet the
objectives of the research questions posed in clarity, length and overall lay-out. The next
objective was to pilot test the survey.
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Pilot Test
A pilot testing of the survey instrument was conducted to determine whether any
additional modifications to the survey were needed. Five sworn members of the LAPD
representative ranks to be surveyed were asked to participate in the testing of the survey
instrument in order to assess whether the information being asked was relevant, clearly
stated and to provide estimates of completion time for the survey instrument itself. At the
end of this process, the researcher was able to effectively evaluate the suggestions and
content provided by the pilot group and make appropriate adjustments as needed. Only
minor adjustments were made to the selection of wording for one or more questions. Pilot
participants each indicated that the survey instrument took approximately 15-20 minutes
to complete. Members of the pilot group were excluded from the random selection
process for survey participants.
Sample Size
Due to the sensitive nature of this study and the number of employee related
lawsuits currently pending for issues related to whistle-blowing and allegations of
organizational retaliation, a low response was anticipated. Table 4 lists the rank and
gender distribution of participants who were sent surveys after obtaining the required
approvals.
Rea and Parker (1992) provide a formula for calculating minimal sample sizes for
large populations and with interval-level data. Using their tested formula, n = 370 was
determined to be an acceptable sample of the LAPD population, N = 8386.
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Table 4
Sample Population by Rank and Gender
Ranks

Males

Females

Totals

Commander

1 (1%)

1 (1%)

2 (2%)

Captain

6 (8%)

1 (1%)

7 (9%)

Lieutenant

20 (2%)

5 (6%)

25 (8%)

Detective

114 (15%)

43 (6%)

157 (21%)

Sergeant

96 (13%)

17 (2%)

113 (15%)

Police Officer

352 (48%)

84 (11%)

436 (59%)

Totals

589 (80%)

151 (20%)

740 (100%)

The LAPD-Deployment Roster Report (DRR) contains a current listing of
employees by name, rank, ethnicity, hire date, serial number, and current work
assignments. In order to guarantee that an equal representation existed among gender and
rank subgroups, each rank or civil service classification was first stratified by gender then
systematically numbered. Research Randomizer, an online software program for
randomizing numbers, was used for randomizing each rank and gender grouping (see
Urbaniak, 1997). The following groups of personnel were excluded from the target
population prior to the random selection process:
1. Employees who were listed as being on long-term leave from the department
2. Civilian or non-sworn employees and sworn members of certain rank or civil
service classifications
3. The ranks of Police Officer I, Deputy Chief and Chief of Police.
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A total of 740 sworn personnel were selected to participate in the study. This
number was determined to assist in increasing the rate of response while ensuring a
margin of correction for those members of the population who may not be able to
complete the survey (ineligibles) due to pre-scheduled vacations, military leave or on any
other long or short term leave options. Others may also be “non-responsive” or may opt
to not participate in the study at all (Henry, 1990).
Data Collection Procedures
Potential participants each received an addressed survey packet discreetly
packaged in a LAPD Inter-office Envelope stamped as “confidential” at their respective
worksite. Inter-office envelopes are used by department personnel for managing
interdepartmental business mail. Pre-stamped return envelopes contained the name of the
researcher and a designated U.S Post Office box address for respondents to use when
returning the completed surveys.
In order to maintain strict anonymity and confidentiality of survey participants, no
demographic or other identifying information was asked of any participants. A four to
six week time frame was used for survey return and data collection.
Data Collection Strategy
Study participants were each sent a survey packet with a cover-letter from the
researcher advising them of the purpose, intent and significance of this study and that
they had been randomly selected as a possible participant. Each survey packet contained
the cover-letter from the researcher, survey instrument and return envelope with postage
affixed. Packets were sent via intradepartmental LAPD mail service to each selected
participant’s worksite in a concealed LAPD envelope marked “confidential”. In order to
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ensure the confidentiality of their participation, survey participants were asked for their
voluntary compliance in completing the survey instrument outside of their regularly
scheduled work breaks, and preferably away from their work environment.
Participants were also asked to send the completed survey affixed with postage
and return address by mail to the specified post office address provided by researcher.
The cover-letter also indicated that those who chose to receive personal feedback at the
conclusion of the research project may contact the researcher independently to receive a
summary of the results of the study without identifying individual survey responses.
Analysis
Prior to analysis, the data file was cleaned for errors using SPSS software
analysis. Descriptive statistics was used to analyze the quantitative data. All returned
survey data was organized, recorded and then entered into a SPSS-15 data analysis
software program for appropriate identification of frequency distributions. Frequency
distributions determined the percentage of officers who would utilize a particular
resource and which real or perceived consequences corresponded to any of the eight
specific allegations of misconduct listed.
Content Analysis
Content analysis was used by this researcher to identify topics and themes in the
expressed comments provided by respondents in order to gain a richer understanding of
findings when considered along with the quantitative data. Microsoft-Excel provided the
means for segmenting the comments into descriptive themes or types. The process used
followed the recommendations of Creswell (2003):
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1. All qualitative data (expressed comments) were organized on to electronic
spreadsheets to enable the coding of topics and themes.
2. The data was reviewed several times to get a general sense of the overall meaning
and tone
3. A coding process was used to organize the data into “chunks” by segmenting
descriptive sentences or paragraphs into topics with terms based on the language
used by the survey respondents.
4. Coded topics were then considered for evidence of any recurring themes.
5. Topics and themes were considered alongside the quantitative data findings.
6. The findings were conveyed using both narrative and graphic means to describe
the emerging themes and/or multiple perspectives expressed.
Written responses to survey questions 1-8 relating to the “Not Likely” use of
department internal resource options were divided into three main categories: Individual
preference, organizational specific and general commentary. Individual preferences
include a respondent’s reason for not utilizing an identified resource. Organizational
specific included a respondent’s description of a specific aspect of the organization’s
structure or culture that may have influence on the respondent’s decision to not utilize a
given resource option. General commentary refers to any miscellaneous statements
personal opinions provided by the respondent. Written comments for questions 9-16
were divided into Organizational specific and General commentary. These comment
boxes were designed to obtain additional descriptions of consequences not listed in the
survey question. Comments that described additional consequences were coded as being
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organizational specific. Comments that did not meet these criteria were coded as being
general commentary.
External Validity
The strategy used to ensure external validity of the qualitative data was the
inclusion of a detailed description of findings as “shared experiences” so as to present a
solid framework for the study (Creswell, 2003). Several techniques of reliability were
used for the testing of external validity. First, a triangulation of data collection and
analysis was used to strengthen reliability and internal validity. Second, data collection
and analysis was then reported in a clear, detailed manner to provide the reader with a
good understanding of the analytical methods used to capture emergent themes from the
expressed comments. Lastly, a second researcher assisted in theme development.
Coder Reliability
To determine coder reliability, a doctoral graduate from Pepperdine University
served as a peer examiner of the qualitative findings. Second, the careful and deliberate
multiple reviews of the qualitative data following Creswell’s (2003) strategies support
intra-rater reliability. This process occurred prior to the third strategy that involved a
second researcher. In order to ensure reliable interpretation of qualitative data, the coded
data was reviewed in depth by the peer examiner who is experienced in textual analysis.
Coding results were discussed and extensive discussions regarding any identifiable
conclusions. The coding process continued until consensus was obtained. Several areas
presented challenging considerations; these involved the areas of determining
relationships among comments that did not comply with instructions given, and ensuring
researcher objectivity.
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As a law enforcement officer employed by the organization being surveyed it was
critically important to be self-aware and to be able to acknowledge when personal
assumptions or bias may possibly interfere with the coding or interpretation of comments.
One way to deter this from occurring was to engage in frequent dialogue with the coreviewer about emerging patterns. Written comments indicating that a particular resource
was an unacceptable option for any reason was coded as Other resource option preferred.
Descriptions of behaviors that pertained to the fear of retaliation or retribution that may
dissuade him/her from reporting to the described resource were coded as Fear of
Retaliation.
Any expressed statements pertaining to a real or perceived code of silence were
coded as code of silence. Expressed comments that alluded to an experienced or
perceived negative successful outcome were coded as No successful outcome. Comments
that indicated that respondents preferred to manage the reported misconduct themselves
without intervention or who preferred to not report the misconduct were coded as Selfmanage. Comments that described additional consequences were coded as being
organizational specific. Comments that did not meet these criteria were coded as being
general commentary.
Assumptions and Delimitations
Assumptions
There were several assumptions made during this research study:
1. There would be significant impacts to employees who whistle-blow or report
selected types of misconduct to internal reporting avenues.
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2. The majority of whistle-blowing employees who report selected types of
misconduct in the law enforcement profession are police officers above the
rank of recruit and below the rank of deputy chief.
3. Respondents will be candid in their responses.
4. Respondents will only submit one survey per participant.
5. The survey response rate would be over 20 percent due to the current trend of
employee related civil lawsuits and the researcher being an employee within
the organization.
Delimitations
One delimitation of the study was the requirement that all survey participants be
sworn members of the Los Angeles Police Department between the ranks of Police
Officer II through Commander. This requirement was based on a review of 53 civil
lawsuits filed by Los Angeles Police Officers between the years 2004 and 2008 which
indicated that very few of these lawsuits were filed by civilian or non-sworn employees,
and the assumption that more sworn police officers would use the internal reporting
systems in place for whistle-blowing. The population was reduced by the elimination of
the Police Officer 1 and Deputy Chief ranks, due to the assumption that probationary
officers (Police Officer1) and rank of Deputy Chief rarely utilize the internal misconduct
reporting systems in place for employees. As a result of these assumptions and
requirements, the population sampling and subsequent findings are limited in scope.
Summary
A self-administered survey instrument was distributed to 740 sworn police
officers employed by the Los Angeles Police Department using a proportionate random
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sampling method stratified by gender within each rank. The instrument included a list of
eight (8) of the most common employee misconduct violations reported by LAPD police
officers to external reporting sources. Survey participants were asked to determine the
likelihood of reporting each of the given misconduct allegations through each of the eight
(8) internal resources listed, indicate why they would “Not Likely” use a particular
resource and lastly, identify any actual or perceived consequences or impacts caused by
reporting these allegations through internal reporting avenues.
Quantitative Research data was obtained, recorded and imported into SPSS-15
statistical analysis software. Expressed comments were analyzed and coded for themes
and patterns using Microsoft-Excel software. Many of the survey respondents did not
provide in-depth responses as to why particular resources were not chosen as a likely
resource option for reporting misconduct. A total of 80 responses were analyzed. The
qualitative data was reviewed by a peer reviewer to determine coder reliability. To
ensure intra-rater reliability, the peer reviewer and researcher had an independent review
of the data followed by frequent dialogues about the data findings in order to remove the
possibility of researcher bias.
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CHAPTER IV: RESULTS
The purpose of this chapter is to present the analyses and findings of the study.
Descriptive analyses were performed in order to answer the four research questions. The
presentation of findings will match the structure of the survey instrument. Part one of the
instrument was designed to determine the respondent’s likelihood of reporting or not
reporting specific misconduct allegations through the use of eight established LAPD
organizational reporting avenues. Part two of the instrument was designed to measure the
actual and/or perceived impact or consequences of whistle-blowing. The quantitative
survey responses will be integrated with the analyzed qualitative data of respondents’
comments. Each type of misconduct will be addressed separately.
Final Sample for Analysis
The targeted population (N = 740) consisted of a random sampling of the civil
service classifications of Police Officer (59%, n = 436), Sergeant (15%, n = 113),
Detective (21%, n = 157), Lieutenants (8%, n = 25), Captains (9%, n = 7), and
Commander (2%, n = 2), stratified by gender (males = 80%, n = 589, females = 20%,
n = 151) within each rank. Of the 740 surveys distributed, a total of 131 useable surveys
were returned for a response rate of 18%. The returned surveys contained a number of
missing or non-responses to one or more of the survey questions. The presentation of
results will include the total number of responses received for each survey question.
Survey Responses: Part One
The eight types of misconduct were analyzed as described in Chapter III. Table
D2 (Appendix D) illustrates the likelihood of reporting each of the specific acts of
misconduct to each of the internal reporting resources. To aid in the explanation of the
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results, the presentation of findings will include (a) each internal resource receiving the
highest percentage of respondents indicating a likeliness of use for reporting the listed
type of misconduct and (b) the internal resource rated as being the least likely to be
utilized.
Respondents were also requested to add comments for any reporting option in
which they were unlikely to utilize to report each of the specific allegations of
misconduct. Each resource with an “Unlikely” response rate of 40% or more is
presented.
Misconduct Type: Sexual Harassment
For the reporting of sexual harassment, Supervisor, below the rank of Captain, as
a reporting resource, was selected by the highest number of respondents (79.1%, n =
102). Of these, 50.4% (n = 65) indicated that they would be “Highly Likely” or “Likely”
(28.7%, n = 37) to contact a supervisor to report allegations of sexual harassment. Two
additional resources were also selected by a large percentage of respondents, Command
or Staff Officer, 72.3% (n = 94), and Internal Affairs Group, 68.4% (n = 89).
The resource selected as the “least likely” to be utilized was Behavioral Science
Services (BSS), 76.7% (n = 99). Over 55% of the respondents (55.4%, n = 71) also
indicated their unwillingness to utilize the Work Environment Liaison Division for the
reporting of sexual harassment. The reported likelihood of utilizing each of the eight
internal resource options to report sexual harassment is illustrated below (Table 5).
Supervisor, below the rank of Captain and Command or Staff Officer each had a mode
value of 3 or “Highly Likely”. The Internal Affairs Group had a mode value of 2 or
“Likely”. The resource entities of Employee Relations Section, Work Environment
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Liaison Division, Office of the Inspector General, Retaliation Prevention Unit, and
Behavioral Science Services each had a mode value of 1 or “Unlikely”.
Table 5
Respondents Reporting Sexual Harassment Through Internal Resource Options
Misconduct:

Not Likely
Sexual harassment

Likelihoodª

N

%

n

%

n

Supervisor, below rank of captain (SUPV)

129

20.9

27

79.1

102

Command or Staff Officer, above rank of captain (CSO)

130

27.7

36

72.3

94

Internal Affairs Group (IAG)

130

31.5

41

68.4

89

Employee Relations Section (ERS)

130

45.4

59

55.4

71

Work Environment Liaison Division (WELD)

130

55.4

72

44.6

58

Office of the Inspector General (OIG)

130

46.9

61

53.1

69

Retaliation Prevention Unit (RPU)

129

47.3

61

52.7

68

Behavioral Science Services (BSS)

129

76.7

99

23.2

30

Note. ªCombined Highly Likely and Likely ratings.

Resource: Behavioral Science Services
The largest number of respondents (79%, n = 99) indicated that BSS was not a
likely reporting resource. There were 29 written comments provided as to why BSS
would not be a resource option. Respondents indicated that BSS does not formally
investigate misconduct and as such would not utilize this resource. Others indicated that
they had no confidence in receiving a satisfactory resolution for the reporting of this issue
or expressed negative opinions of BSS. Several respondents indicated that they either did
not trust BSS or would rather self manage their personal issues without receiving
psychological assistance from the department.
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Resource: Work Environment Liaison Division
Just over 55% of the respondents (55.4%, n = 72) indicated that the WELD was
not a likely reporting resource. There were five written comments provided as to why
WELD would not be a resource option. The respondents indicated (a) the resource could
not help with resolving these types of issues or (b) they were unaware of the unit’s
responsibilities.
Resource: Retaliation Prevention Unit
Over 47% of the respondents (47.3%, n = 61) indicated that the RPU was not a
likely reporting resource. There were 12 written comments provided as to why the RPU
would not be a resource option. Individual reasons cited include the preference of
utilizing other internal resource options, a lack of confidence in any successful outcome
to the issue, and an overall unfamiliarity of the unit’s existence or job responsibilities.
Specific organizational reasons include the perception that the unit does not manage or
investigate misconduct complaints and several others commented that they believed their
chain of command would initiate this notification, if they found it necessary to do so.
Resource: Office of the Inspector General
Over 46% of the respondents (46.9%, n = 61) indicated that the OIG was not a
likely reporting resource. There were six written comments provided as to why RPU
would not be a resource option. Comments include an overall lack of confidence and/or
trust in their investigative ability or preference to utilize another internal resource entity.
Specific organizational reasons included the preferred use of the department’s established
chain of command or the perception that the unit is an “outside entity.”
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Misconduct Type: Hostile, Offensive, or Intimidating Work Environment
For the reporting of a hostile or offensive work environment, the Supervisor,
below the rank of Captain, was selected by the highest number of respondents
(78.5%, n = 102). Of these, 45.4% (n = 59) indicated that they would be “Highly
Likely” or “Likely” (33.1%, n = 43) to contact a supervisor to report a hostile work
harassment. Over 70% of the respondents (74.8%, n = 98) indicated they would contact
a Command or Staff Officer and the Internal Affairs Group, 71.8%, (n = 94). The
resource selected as the “least likely” (73.1%, n = 99) to be utilized was Behavioral
Science Services, (BSS). The reporting resources of Supervisor, below rank of Captain;
Command/Staff Officer; and Internal Affairs Group each had a mode value of 3 or
“Highly Likely”. The Retaliation Prevention Unit had a mode value of 2 or “Likely”.
The reporting resources of Employee Relations Section, Work Environment Liaison
Division, Office of the Inspector General, and Behavioral Science Services, all had a
mode value of 1 or “Not Likely”.
The reported likelihood of utilizing each of the eight internal resource options to
report a hostile, offensive or intimidating work environment is illustrated in Table 6.
Resource: Employee Relations Section
Over 45% of the respondents (45.4%, n = 59) indicated that the Employee
Relations Section (ERS) was not a likely resource. There were four comments provided
as to why ERS would not be a resource option. Respondents indicated that they either (a)
did not trust that a satisfactory resolution to the reported issue would occur or (b) that the
non-investigative function of the entity or the entity’s complaint referral policy was an
issue.
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Table 6
Respondents Reporting a Hostile, Offensive, or Intimidating Work Environment through
Internal Resource Options
Misconduct:

Not Likely

Likelihoodª

N

%

n

%

n

Supervisor, below rank of captain (SUPV)

130

21.5

28

78.5

102

Command or Staff Officer, above rank of captain (CSO)

131

25.2

33

74.8

98

Internal Affairs Group (IAG)

131

28.2

37

71.8

94

Employee Relations Section (ERS)

130

45.4

59

54.6

71

Work Environment Liaison Division (WELD)

130

49.2

64

50.8

66

Office of the Inspector General (OIG)

130

40.8

53

61.0

77

Retaliation Prevention Unit (RPU)

130

37.7

49

62.3

81

Behavioral Science Services (BSS)

130

73.1

95

26.9

35

Hostile, Offensive, or Intimidating
Work Environment

Note. ªCombined Highly Likely and Likely ratings.

Resource: Work Environment Liaison Division
Fewer than 50% of the respondents (49.2%, n = 64) indicated that the WELD was
not a likely resource. There were three comments provided by respondents as to why
WELD would not be a resource option. Respondents indicated that they were unfamiliar
with the duties and responsibilities of WELD, or did not believe that the unit was a viable
resource for the reporting of misconduct without, specific examples as to why.
Resource: Office of the Inspector General
Over 40% (40.8%, n = 53) indicated that the OIG was not a likely resource. There
were four comments provided by respondents by as to why the OIG would not be a
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resource option. Respondents indicated that they had never heard of the OIG, did not
trust this resource as a viable entity, or did not believe that it was a requirement to contact
the OIG for these types of complaints.
Resource: Behavioral Science Services
A large number of respondents (73.1%, n = 95) indicated that BSS, was not a
likely reporting resource. There were three written comments provided as to why BSS
would not be a resource option. Respondents indicated that they (a) did not trust BSS or
the services they provide and (b) that they would rather seek psychological assistance
outside of the LAPD.
Misconduct Type: Disparate Treatment (Disability)
For the reporting of disparate treatment due to a work-related disability, the
Supervisor, below the rank of Captain, was selected by a large number of respondents
(83.9%, n = 109). Of these, 43.1% (n = 56) indicated that they would be “Highly
Likely” or “Likely” (40.8%, n = 53) to contact a supervisor to report allegations of
disparate treatment. One additional resource, Command or Staff Officer (68.3%, n = 82),
was also selected by a large number of respondents for the likelihood of reporting
disparate treatment.
The resource selected as the “least likely” to be utilized was Behavioral Science
Services (64.3%, n = 83). The Internal Affairs Group, Employee Relations Section,
Work Environment Liaison Section, Office of the Inspector General, the Retaliation
Prevention Unit, and Behavioral Science Services each had a mode value of 1 or “Not
Likely”. The internal resources of Supervisor had a mode value of 3 or “Highly Likely”.
Command or Staff Officer had a mode value of 2 or “Likely”. The reported likelihood of
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utilizing each of the eight internal resource options to report disparate treatment is
indicated in Table 7.
Table 7
Respondents Reporting Disparate Treatment Through Internal Resource Options
Misconduct:

Not Likely

Likelihoodª

N

%

n

%

n

Supervisor, below rank of captain (SUPV)

130

16.2

21

83.9

109

Command Staff Officer, above rank of captain (CSO)

129

31.8

41

68.3

88

Internal Affairs Group (IAG)

129

51.2

66

48.9

63

Employee Relations Section (ERS)

128

42.2

54

57.8

74

Work Environment Liaison Division (WELD)

129

53.5

69

46.5

60

Office of the Inspector General (OIG)

129

60.4

78

39.6

51

Retaliation Prevention Unit (RPU)

129

51.9

67

48.1

62

Behavioral Science Services (BSS)

129

64.3

83

35.7

46

Disparate Treatment (Disability)

Note. ªCombined Highly Likely and Likely ratings

Resource: Internal Affairs Group
Over 50% (51.2%, n = 66) indicated that the IAG, was not a likely resource.
There were four comments provided by respondents by as to why the IAG would not be a
resource option. Responses provided by respondents for not utilizing this resource
include (a) their preference of self-managing the issue without intervention or (b) the lack
of confidence that a disability issue would be properly addressed by this entity.
Resource: Employee Resource Section
Over 40% (42.2%, n = 54) indicated that the ERS, was not a likely resource.
There were five comments provided by respondents as to why the ERS would not be a
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resource option. Individual reasons provided by respondents not utilizing this resource
include a lack of trust in all department Captains, the preference of utilizing an alternate
internal resource or of self-managing the issue without intervention. Organizational
reasons include a preference to utilize the lowest chain of command (Supervisor, below
rank of captain).
Resource: Work Environment Liaison Division
Over 50% (53.5%, n = 69) indicated that WELD, was not a likely resource.
There were six comments provided by respondents as to why WELD would not be a
resource option. Individual reasons for not utilizing this resource include a preference for
other internal resource options, lack of confidence that a satisfactory outcome will be
achieved, unfamiliarity with the entity's responsibilities, and the preference of selfmanaging the issue. Organizational reasons include the non-investigative function of the
unit for the resolution of misconduct complaints.
Resource: Office of the Inspector General
Over 60% of the respondents (60.4%, n = 78), indicated that the OIG, was not a
likely resource. There were five comments provided by respondents as to why the OIG
would not be a resource option. Individual reasons include the preference of selfmanaging the issue without intervention, and a preference for utilizing other specialized
resource options. Organizational reasons include the preference of remaining within the
established chain of command for reporting this type of misconduct.
Resource: Retaliation Prevention Unit
Over 50% of the respondents (51.9%, n = 67) indicated that the RPU was not a
likely resource. There were five comments provided by respondents as the why the RPU
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would not be a resource option. Individual responses provided by respondents include a
preference of self-managing the issue without intervention. Organizational reasons for
not utilizing this resource include the perception that this resource would not formally
investigate this type of issue.
Resource: Behavioral Science Services
Over 60% of the respondents (64.3%, n = 83) indicated that BSS was not a likely
resource. There were six comments provided by respondents as to why BSS would not
be a resource option. Individual reasons include a preference for an alternative internal
resource option, preference to self-manage the issue without intervention or lack of
confidence in a satisfactory outcome. Organizational reasons include the noninvestigative function of the entity.
Misconduct Type: Non-Selection for Promotion – Race or Gender
For the reporting of a non-selection for promotion or pay-grade assignment due to
race or gender, the internal resource option of Command or Staff Officer was selected by
the highest number of respondents (65.5%, n = 76). Of these, 29.2% (n = 38) indicated
that they would be “Highly Likely” or “Likely” (29.2%, n = 38) to contact a Command
or Staff Officer to report non-selection for promotion due to race or gender. The next
highest number of respondents indicated that they would also contact Employee
Relations Section 57.8% (n = 74). The resource selected as the “least likely” to be
utilized was Behavioral Science Services (82.2%, n = 106). All eight resource options
had a mode value of 1 or “Not Likely”. The reported likelihood of utilizing each of the
eight internal resource options to report non-selection for promotion or pay-grade
advancement due to race or gender is shown below (Table 8).
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Table 8
Respondents Reporting a Non-selection for Promotion (Race or Gender) Through
Internal Resource Options
Misconduct:

Not Likely

Likelihoodª

N

%

n

%

n

Supervisor, below rank of captain (SUPV)

130

42.3

55

57.7

75

Command Staff Officer, above rank of captain (CSO)

130

41.5

54

65.5

76

Internal Affairs Group (IAG)

130

55.4

72

44.6

58

Employee Relations Section (ERS)

130

43.8

57

56.2

73

Work Environment Liaison Division (WELD)

131

60.3

79

39.7

52

Office of the Inspector General (OIG)

130

56.9

74

43.1

56

Retaliation Prevention Unit (RPU)

130

58.5

76

48.1

54

Behavioral Science Services (BSS)

129

82.2

106

35.7

23

Non-selection Promotion – Race/gender

Note. ªCombined Highly Likely and Likely ratings

Resource: Internal Affairs Group
Over 40% of the respondents (43.8%, n = 72) indicated that IAG), was not a
likely resource. There were 14 comments provided by respondents as the why the RPU
would not be a resource option. Individual reasons for not utilizing this resource include
a preference of other internal resource options, lack of confidence in receiving a
satisfactory resolution to the issue, and fear of retribution. Organizational reasons
included several general comments relating to the perceived strong element of proof
needed to report this type of misconduct and the belief that this type of misconduct would
not be investigated by IAG. One respondent wrote, "I am not part of a protected class so
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reporting this behavior would probably be detrimental to my career/professional life"
(R107).
Resource: Office of the Inspector General
Over 55% of the respondents (55.9%, n = 74) indicated that the OIG, was not a
likely resource. There were 19 comments provided by respondents as the why the OIG
would not be a resource option. Individual responses include other internal resource
option preferred, unfamiliarity with the resource's investigative functions, lack of trust in
the entity or satisfactory outcome of the issue being reported, and the fear of retaliation.
Organizational reasons for not utilizing this resource include a preference for established
chain of command and several general commentaries referring to the perceived
preferential treatment given to lawfully protected classes for promotions.
Resource: Retaliation Prevention Unit
Over 58% of the respondents (58.5%, n = 76) indicated that the RPU, was not a
likely resource. There were 17 comments provided by respondents as the why the RPU
would not be a likely resource option. Individual responses include a lack of confidence
in a satisfactory resolution to the issue, other resource option preferences, fear of
retaliation, or unfamiliarity with the resource's investigative responsibilities.
Organizational reasons include the non-investigative function of the unit and general
commentary regarding preferential selection of members of protected classes.
Resource: Behavioral Science Services
Over 82% of the respondents (82.2%, n = 106) indicated that BSS, would not be a
likely resource option. There were 24 comments provided by respondents as to why the
BSS was not a resource option. Individual reasons for not utilizing this resource include
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the choice of other preferred internal options, lack of confidence in a satisfactory
resolution, mistrust of the entity, and fear of retribution. Organizational reasons include
the non-investigative function of this entity and general commentary regarding the
perception that this entity would not have the ability to resolve the reported issue.
Misconduct Type: Gender or Racial Comments at Work
For the reporting of gender or racial comments at work, the internal resource
option of Supervisor, below the rank of Captain was selected by the highest
number of respondents (75.4%, n = 98). Of these, 43.8% (n = 57) indicated that they
would be “Highly Likely” or “Likely” (31.5%, n = 41) to contact a supervisor to report
being subjected to gender or racial comments at work. The next highest number of
respondents (69%, n = 89) indicated that they would contact a Command or Staff Officer.
The likelihood of reporting to a supervisor, Internal Affairs Group, and Command or
Staff Officer, received a mode value of 3 or “Highly Likely”. The remaining resource
options of Employee Relations Group, Work Environment Liaison Division, Office of the
Inspector General (OIG), Retaliation Prevention Unit, and the Behavioral Science
Services (BSS), each received a mode value of 1 or “Not Likely”. The percentage of
respondents who would likely report gender and/or racial comments to a department
resource are listed below (Table 9).
Resource: Employee Relations Section
Over 50% of the respondents (51.5%, n = 67) indicated that Employee Relations
Section (ERS) was not a likely resource. There were nine comments provided by
respondents as to why the BSS would not be a resource option. Individual responses
include the preference of self-managing the issue without intervention, the perception that

85

this entity could not influence a change in behavior, the fear of retaliation, and lack of
confidence in there being a successful outcome to the issue.
Table 9
Respondents Reporting Gender and/or Racial Comments at Work Through Department
Options
Misconduct:

Not Likely

Likelihoodª

N

%

n

%

n

Supervisor, below rank of captain (SUPV)

130

24.6

32

75.4

98

Command Staff Officer, above rank of captain (CSO)

129

31.0

40

69.0

89

Internal Affairs Group (IAG)

127

32.3

41

67.7

86

Employee Relations Section (ERS)

130

51.5

67

57.8

74

Work Environment Liaison Division (WELD)

130

60.8

79

39.2

51

Office of the Inspector General (OIG)

128

50.0

64

50.0

64

Retaliation Prevention Unit (RPU)

127

44.8

61

55.2

66

Behavioral Science Services (BSS)

127

75.6

96

24.4

31

Gender/racial Comments at Work

Note. ªCombined Highly Likely and Likely ratings

Resource: Work Environment Liaison Division
Over 60% of the respondents (60.8%, n = 79) indicated that WELD was not a
likely resource. There were 11 comments provided by respondents as to why WELD was
not a resource option. Individual reasons for not utilizing this resource include the
preference of self-managing the issue without intervention, lack of confidence in the
entity's ability to assist with this type of issue, and a preference for an alternate resource
option.
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Resource: Office of the Inspector General
Fifty percent of the respondents (n = 64) indicated that the OIG, was not a likely
resource. There were 17 comments provided by respondents as to why the OIG would
not be a resource option. Individual reasons provided include, an overall lack of
confidence that the problem would be resolved, lack of trust in the entity's investigative
ability, preference to self-manage the issue without intervention, and unfamiliarity with
the resource's function. Organizational reasons include the perceived non-investigative
function of the entity.
Resource: Retaliation Prevention Unit
Over 46% of the respondents (46.6%, n = 96) indicated that the RPU was not a
likely resource. There were 14 comments provided by respondents as to why the RPU
would not be a resource option. Individual reasons for not utilizing this resource include
a general distrust in the entity's investigative ability to resolve misconduct issues,
unfamiliarity with the entity's responsibilities, the preference for self-managing the issue
without intervention, and the lack of confidence in a satisfactory outcome. Several
commented that this type of misconduct would not be resolved by this entity because it is
not considered to be retaliatory conduct. Organizational reasons include the perception
of non-investigative function associated with the entity, and a general opinion about the
entire department being less than professional with respect to managing internal
employee complaints.
Resource: Behavioral Science Services
Over 75% of the respondents (75.6%, n = 61) indicated that BSS was not a likely
resource. There were 21 comments provided by respondents as to why BSS was not a
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resource option. Individual reasons include a lack of confidence in a successful outcome,
lack of trust in their ability to assist, and the preference of self-managing their issue
without psychological intervention. Several respondents indicated that they would only
contact this entity if the misconduct was affecting their ability to work. Organizational
reasons include the non-investigative function of this entity.
Misconduct Type: Personality Conflict With a Supervisor
For the reporting of a personality conflict with a supervisor with negative
impacts, Command or Staff Officer was selected by the highest number of respondents
(73.8%, n = 96). Of these, 44.6% (n = 58) indicated that they would “Highly Likely” or
“Likely” (29.2%, n = 28) contact a Command or Staff Officer to report a conflict with a
supervisor with negative impacts. The next highest number of respondents (58.1%, n =
75) indicated that they would contact a Supervisor, below the rank of Captain. The
reporting resource of Command or Staff Officer had a mode value of 3 or “Highly
Likely”. The other seven internal reporting resources of Supervisor, under the rank of
Captain, Internal Affairs Group, Employee Relations Section, Work Environment Liaison
Division, Office of the Inspector General (OIG), Retaliation Prevention Unit, and
Behavioral Science Services all had a mode value of 1 or “Not Likely”. The percentage
of respondents who would report a personality conflict with a supervisor to a department
resource is illustrated below (Table 10).
Resource: Internal Affairs Group
Over 55% of the respondents (55.8%, n = 72) indicated that Internal Affairs
Group (IAG) was not a likely resource. There were 28 comments provided by
respondents as to why IAG would not be a resource option. Individual reasons provided
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by respondents include the preferred use of alternate internal resource options, the
perception about this type of complaint not rising to the level of a formal misconduct
investigation, or not being a viable resource for help. One respondent commented that he
or she experienced retaliation for “reporting misconduct in the past from the accused and
the investigating officer at Internal Affairs" (R121). Organizational reasons include the
preference of reporting through the established chain of command at the lowest
supervisor level first, or reporting it only if action was not taken at the supervisor’s level.
Several respondents had the perception that a complaint investigation would not
be initiated and that personality conflicts of this type are too common on the department
for supervisors to manage.
Table 10
Respondents Reporting a Conflict With Supervisor Through Internal Options
Misconduct:
N

Conflict with Supervisor

Not
Likely
%

Likelihoodª
n

%

n

Supervisor, below rank of captain (SUPV)

129

41.9

54

58.1

75

Command Staff Officer, above rank of captain (CSO)

130

26.2

34

73.8

96

Internal Affairs Group (IAG)

129

55.8

72

44.2

57

Employee Relations Section (ERS)

128

58.6

75

41.4

53

Work Environment Liaison Division (WELD)

130

61.5

80

38.5

50

Office of the Inspector General (OIG)

128

65.6

84

34.4

44

Retaliation Prevention Unit (RPU)

128

55.5

71

44.5

57

Behavioral Science Services (BSS)

127

68.5

87

31.5

40

Note. ªCombined Highly Likely and Likely ratings.
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Resource: Employee Relations Section
Over 55% of the respondents (58.6%, n = 75) indicated that ERS was not a likely
resource. There were 19 comments provided by respondents as to why ERS would not be
a resource option. Individual reasons provided by respondents include, (a) preferences
for other internal resource options, and (b) the preference to transfer in fear of retribution.
Organizational reasons include the preference of utilizing the organization's established
chain of command and the perceived notion that this entity does not handle this type of
misconduct.
Resource: Work Environment Liaison Division
Over 60% of the respondents (61.5%, n = 80) indicated that WELD would not be
a likely resource. There were 19 comments provided by respondents as to why WELD
would not be a resource option. Individual reasons provided by respondents include the
preference of self-managing the issue without intervention, not having confidence in a
successful outcome, preference for other specialized resource options, the fear of
retribution, and general unfamiliarity with the resource function. Organizational reasons
include the non-investigative and referral policies of the entity and preference to utilize
the organization's chain of command.
Resource: Office of the Inspector General
Over 65% of the respondents (65.6%, n = 84) indicated that the OIG would not
be a likely resource. There were 22 comments provided by respondents as to why the
OIG would not be a resource option. Individual reasons provided by respondents include
the fear of retribution. One respondent wrote, "it is not encouraged to bad mouth
supervisors, or anyone above.” (R27) Other reasons include the preference of self-
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managing the issue without intervention, the preference for early intervention by
preventing a formal complaint, and other preferred internal resource options.
Organizational reasons include the lack of trust in the entity's ability to conduct a
thorough, unbiased and appropriate investigation, length of time to resolve the issue, and
unfamiliarity with the investigative functions of the entity.
Resource: Retaliation Prevention Unit
Over 55% of the respondents (55.5%, n = 71) indicated that the RPU would not
be a likely resource. There were 22 comments provided by respondents as to why the
RPU would not be a resource option. Individual reasons provided by respondents
include, a lack of confidence for a successful outcome, preference to self-manage the
issue without intervention, fear of retaliation or retribution, and preference for an
alternate internal resource option. Organizational reasons for not utilizing this resource
include the preference of utilizing existing chain of command, the perceived noninvestigatory function of the entity, and the belief that this type of misconduct did not rise
to the level of a retaliation allegation.
Resource: Behavioral Science Services
Over 60% of the respondents (68.5%, n = 87) indicated that BSS would not be a
likely resource. There were 24 comments provided by respondents as to why BSS would
not be a resource option. Individual reasons provided by respondents include having
other preferred resource options, no confidence in achieving a satisfactory outcome,
preference to self-manage without intervention, fear of retaliation. The organizational
reasons for not utilizing this resource include the preference of utilizing the established
chain of command;
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Misconduct Type: Denied Hardship - Watch or Assignment Change
For the reporting of being denied a hardship change of watch or change of
assignment because of race or gender, Command or Staff Officer was selected by the
highest number of respondents (71.5%, n = 89). Of these, respondents indicated that they
would be “Highly Likely” (42.2%, n = 54), or “Likely” (29.3%, n = 35) to report being
denied a hardship change of watch or change of assignment because of race or gender to
a Command or Staff Officer. The next highest number of respondents (66.4%), n = 85)
indicated that they would contact a Supervisor below the rank of Captain. The least
likely utilized resource was Behavioral Science Services, 74% (n = 95). The reporting
resource options of Supervisor and Command or Staff Officer had a mode value of 3 or
“Highly Likely”.
The remaining six resource options of Internal Affairs Group, Employee
Relations Group, Work Environment Liaison Division, Office of the Inspector General,
Retaliation Prevention Unit, and Behavioral Science Services had mode values of 1 or
“Not Likely”. The percentage of respondents who indicated they would likely utilize
these resource options to report a denied hardship-watch or assignment change due to
race and/or gender is illustrated below (Table 11).
Resource: Internal Affairs Group
Over 50% of the respondents (52.0%, n = 65) indicated that IAG was not a likely
resource. There were 30 comments provided by respondents as to why IAG was not a
resource option. Individual reasons provided by respondents include the fear of
retaliation, preference for another resource option, lack of confidence in a successful
outcome, and the preference of self-managing the reported issue without intervention. A
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respondent wrote, "I wouldn't report this because the possibility for retaliation is too high
and this is not a battle worth fighting" (R18). An organizational reason provided by
several respondents involved the preferred use of the established chain of command.
Table 11
Respondents Reporting a Denied Change of Watch or Assignment Hardship Through
Internal Options
Misconduct:
N

Denied Change of Watch or Assignment

Not
Likely
%

Likelihoodª
n

%

n

Supervisor, below rank of captain (SUPV)

128

33.6

43

66.4

85

Command Staff Officer, above rank of captain (CSO)

128

30.5

39

69.5

89

Internal Affairs Group (IAG)

125

52.0

65

48.0

60

Employee Relations Section (ERS)

128

49.2

63

50.8

65

Work Environment Liaison Division (WELD)

128

59.4

76

40.6

52

Office of the Inspector General (OIG)

127

62.2

79

37.8

48

Retaliation Prevention Unit (RPU)

127

56.7

72

43.3

55

Behavioral Science Services (BSS)

127

74.8

95

25.2

32

Note. ªCombined Highly Likely and Likely ratings.

Resource: Employee Relations Section
Over 45% of the respondents (49.2%, n = 63) indicated that ERS was not a likely
resource. There were 21 comments provided by respondents as to why ERS would not be
a resource option. Individual reasons provided by respondents included the lack of
confidence in obtaining a satisfactory resolution of the issue, other preferred internal
resource option, fear of retaliation, unfamiliarity with the resource entity, and the
preference of self-managing the issue without intervention. One respondent indicated that
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the "System would support any decisions against you" (R60). Organizational reasons for
not utilizing this resource include the preference of utilizing the organization's chain of
command.
Resource: Work Environment Liaison Division
Over 55% of the respondents (59.4%, n = 76) indicated that WELD was not a
likely resource. There were 27 comments provided by respondents as to why WELD
would not be a resource option. Individual reasons provided by respondents include the
preference of utilizing alternate internal resources, the belief that change would occur,
and the fear of retaliation. Other reasons include the preference to self-manage the issue
without intervention, and unfamiliarity with the entity's function. Organizational reasons
include the preference of utilizing the organization's chain of command and the
preference of contacting resources with investigative functions.
Resource: Office of the Inspector General
Over 60% of the respondents (62.2%, n = 79) indicated that OIG was not a likely
resource. There were 27 comments provided by respondents as to why the OIG would
not be a resource option. Individual reasons provided by respondents include the lack of
confidence in a satisfactory resolution of the issue, the preference of utilizing an
alternative resource option, the preference to self-manage the issue without intervention,
and fear of retaliation. Organizational reasons include the preference of utilizing the
established chain of command and the preference of contacting a resource with
investigative authority. One respondent indicated, "The dept will slowly destroy you for
"snitching" (R64).
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Resource: Retaliation Prevention Unit
Over 50% of the respondents (56.7%, n = 72) indicated that RPU was not a
likely resource. There were a total of 27 comments provided by respondents as to why
the RPU would not be a resource option. Individual reasons provided by respondents
include the preference of utilizing an alternate internal resource option, lack of
confidence in achieving a successful outcome to the issue, fear of retaliation for reporting
the issue, perception that reporting would not affect needed change, or that the issue
would be too difficult to prove. Many of the respondents commented on the possibility
of retribution for reporting misconduct to the organization. Organizational reasons
include the preference of utilizing the organization's established chain of command.
Resource: Behavioral Science Services
Over 74% of the respondents (74.8%, n = 95) indicated that BSS was not a likely
resource. There were 34 comments provided by respondents as to why BSS would not be
a resource option. Individual reasons provided by respondents include preferences for
other internal resource options, lack of confidence in achieving a satisfactory outcome,
lack of trust in their ability to assist, and preference to self-manage the issue without
intervention. Several respondents indicated that they would only contact this entity if the
misconduct was affecting their ability to work. Organizational reasons include the noninvestigative function of this entity.
Misconduct Type: Denied Specialized Training or Assignment - Race or Gender
For the reporting of being denied specialized training or assignment because of
race or gender, Command or Staff Officer was selected by the highest number of
respondents (63.3%, n = 81). Of these, respondents indicated that they would be “Highly
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Likely” (24.8%, n = 32), or “Likely” (34.1%, n = 76) to report being denied a hardship
change of watch or change of assignment because of race or gender to a Command or
Staff Officer. The next highest number of respondents (58.9%, n = 76) indicated that they
would contact a supervisor, below the rank of Captain. The least likely resource to be
utilized by respondents was Behavioral Science Services (77%, n = 97). All eight of the
reporting resource options had a mode value of 1 or “Unlikely”. The percentage of
respondents who indicated they would likely utilize these resource options to report a
denied training opportunity due to race or gender is illustrated below (Table 12).
Table 12
Respondents Reporting a Denied Specialized Training or Assignment (Race/Gender)
Through Internal Resource Options
Misconduct:
N

Denied Specialized Training or Assignment

Not
Likely
%

Likelihoodª
n

%

n

Supervisor, below rank of captain (SUPV)

129

41.1

53

58.9

76

Command Staff Officer, above rank of captain (CSO)

128

36.7

47

63.3

81

Internal Affairs Group (IAG)

127

57.5

73

42.5

54

Employee Relations Section (ERS)

128

54.7

70

45.3

58

Work Environment Liaison Division (WELD)

128

59.4

83

40.6

45

Office of the Inspector General (OIG)

127

61.4

78

38.6

49

Retaliation Prevention Unit (RPU)

127

59.8

76

40.2

51

Behavioral Science Services (BSS)

126

77.0

97

23.0

29

Note. ªCombined Highly Likely and Likely ratings.
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Resource: Internal Affairs Group
Over 55% of the respondents (57.5%, n = 73) indicated that IAG was not a likely
resource option. There were 14 comments provided by respondents as to why IAG
would not be a resource option. Individual reasons provided by respondents include a
lack of confidence in a satisfactory outcome, preference for an alternate internal resource
option, and fear of retaliation. Organizational reasons include (a) a preference to utilize
the organization's established chain of command, and (b) past negative experiences with
the entity. On respondent commented, “A complaint wouldn’t be taken by IAG… if so it
would go nowhere and it would be a death sentence for the officer reporting in LAPD!”
(R14).
Resource: Employee Resource Section
Over 50% of the respondents (54.7%, n = 70) indicated that ERS was not a
resource option. There were nine comments provided by respondents as to why ERS
would not be a resource option. Individual reasons provided by respondents include a
preference for utilizing another internal resource, lack of confidence in achieving a
satisfactory outcome, and fear of retaliation. Organizational reasons include the
preference of utilizing the organization's chain of command, and the perception that this
entity does not investigate this type of misconduct.
Resource: Work Environment Liaison Division
Over 60% of the respondents (64.8%, n = 83) indicated that WELD was not a
likely resource. There were nine comments provided by respondents as to why WELD
would not be a resource option. Individual reasons provided by respondents include, the
preference of other internal resource options, lack of confidence in a satisfactory
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outcome, and the fear of retaliation. Organizational reasons include (a) the preference of
utilizing the organization's established chain of command and (b) the non-investigative
function of this entity.
Resource: Office of the Inspector General
Over 60% of the respondents (61.4%, n = 78) indicated that the OIG was not a
likely resource. There were 14 comments provided by respondents as to why the OIG
was not a resource option. Individual reasons provided by respondents include the
preference of using alternate internal resource options, lack of confidence for a
satisfactory outcome, fear of being labeled a crybaby or whiner, the length of time it
would take to resolve the issue, and unfamiliarity with this entity as a viable resource.
Resource: Retaliation Prevention Unit
Fewer than 60% (59.8%, n = 76) indicated that the RPU was not a likely resource.
There were 10 comments provided by respondents as to why the RPU would not be a
resource option. Individual reasons provided by respondents include the preference of
utilizing other internal resource options, lack of confidence in achieving a satisfactory
outcome of the issue, and fear of retaliation. Organizational reasons include (a) a
preference of utilizing the organization's established chain of command and (b) the noninvestigative function of the entity.
Resource: Behavioral Science Services
Fewer than 80% of the respondents (77.0%, n = 97) indicated that BSS was not a
likely resource. There were 15 comments provided by respondents as to why BSS would
not be a resource option. Individual reasons provided by respondents include the
preference of utilizing alternate internal resource options, lack of confidence in achieving
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a satisfactory outcome, and fear of retaliation. Organizational reasons include (a) the
preference of utilizing the organization's established chain of command, and (2) the noninvestigative function of the entity.
Survey Responses: Part Two
The eight perceived impacts of whistle-blowing were analyzed as described in
Chapter III. Table D1 (see Appendix D) illustrates the perceived impacts of reporting
specific acts of misconduct through internal department options. To aid in the
explanation of the results the presentation of findings will include (a) the highest
percentages of respondents indicating a perceived likelihood of experiencing real or
perceived consequences for reporting the listed type of misconduct, (b) the percentage of
those indicating satisfactory resolution as an impact, (c) additional impacts or
consequences described by respondents, and (d) the listing of recommendations for
improvements provided by respondents.
Reported Misconduct: Sexual Harassment
For the reporting of consequences related to allegations of sexual harassment,
alienation or silent treatment by peers (72.1%, n = 93) and harsh treatment by coworkers (55.8%, n = 72) were selected with the highest frequency. Satisfactory
Resolution was selected by 53.8% (n = 70) of the respondents. The percentage of
respondents perceiving the likelihood of experiencing consequences for reporting sexual
harassment to any of the department resources is listed below (Table 13).
There were eight comments provided by respondents regarding the impacts of
reporting of sexual harassment. Respondents indicated additional acts as, being restricted
from working with specific partners or gender, increased stress, the need to transfer from
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the division, establishing a career long reputation, receiving harsh treatment from
supervisors, reduced work performance, lowered productivity, and family conflicts.
Table 13
Respondents’ Likelihood of Experiencing Impacts for Reporting Sexual Harassment
Impacts:
Reporting Sexual

N

Not
Likely
%

Likelihoodª
n

%

n

Harassment

Alienation/silent treatment

129

27.9

36

72.1

93

Harsh treatment by peers

129

44.2

57

55.8

72

Involuntary transfer

128

53.1

68

46.9

60

Demeaning job tasks

129

60.9

78

39.1

50

“Freeway therapy”

129

65.6

84

34.4

44

Lowered evaluation

128

66.7

86

33.3

43

Demotion or downgrade

128

82.9

107

17.1

22

Satisfactory resolution

130

46.2

60

53.8

70

Note. ª Combined Highly Likely and Likely totals.

Reported Misconduct: Hostile, Offensive, or Intimidating Work Environment
For the reporting of consequences related to allegations of a hostile, intimidating,
or offensive work environment alienation or silent treatment from co-workers
(70.5%, n = 91) and harsh treatment by peers (52.7%, n = 68) were selected with the
highest frequency by respondents. Satisfactory Resolution was selected by 47.3%
(n = 62) of the respondents. The percentage of respondents perceiving the likelihood of
experiencing consequences for reporting a hostile, intimidating, or offensive work
environment to any of the department resources is illustrated below (Table 14). There
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were 12 comments provided by respondents regarding the impacts of reporting of a
hostile, offensive, or intimidating work environment.
Table 14
Respondents’ Likelihood of Impacts for Reporting a Hostile, Offensive, or Intimidating
Work Environment
Impacts:
Reporting a Hostile,

N

Not
Likely
%

Likelihoodª
n

%

n

Offensive or Intimidating
Work Environment

Alienation/silent treatment

129

27.9

36

72.1

93

Harsh treatment by peers

129

44.2

57

55.8

72

Involuntary transfer

128

53.1

68

46.9

60

Demeaning job tasks

129

60.9

78

39.1

50

“Freeway therapy”

129

65.6

84

34.4

44

Lowered evaluation

128

66.7

86

33.3

43

Demotion or downgrade

128

82.9

107

17.1

22

Satisfactory resolution

130

46.2

60

53.8

70

Note. ªCombined Highly Likely and Likely totals.

Respondents indicated additional acts as, receiving slow back-up assistance and
loss of friendships, being labeled a malcontent, receiving harsh treatment from
supervisors, increased levels of stress and reduced performance, and the possibility of not
receiving future promotional oral interview opportunities.
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Reported Misconduct: Disparate Treatment for Work-Related Disability
For the reporting of consequences related to allegations of a disparate treatment
for a work related disability alienation or the silent treatment from co-workers
(50.0%, n = 63) and involuntary transfer of assignment (36.6%, n = 50) were selected
with the highest frequency by respondents. Satisfactory Resolution was selected by 62%
of the respondents and had a mode value of 2 or “Likely”. The remaining seven impacts
of reporting disparate treatment for a work-related disability received mode values of 1 or
“Not Likely”.
There were seven comments provided by respondents concerning the impact of
reporting disparate treatment due to a work-related disability. Respondents indicated
additional acts as, co-workers not being as willing to converse with the complaining
party, decreased work motivation, and being “benched” (working desk duties) at the
station with undesirable watch work hours.
The percentage of respondents perceiving the likelihood of experiencing
consequences for reporting disparate treatment received due to a work related disability
to any of the department resources is illustrated in Table 15.
Reported Misconduct: Non-Selection for Promotion Due to Race or Gender
For the reporting of consequences related to a non-promotion due to race or
gender, alienation or the silent treatment from co-workers (61.2%, n = 79) and harsh
treatment by co-workers (51.1%, n = 65) were selected with the highest frequency by
respondents. Satisfactory Resolution was selected by 62% (n = 80) of the respondents.
Alienation or silent treatment had a mode value of 2 or “Likely”. The remaining seven
types of impacts received a mode value of 1 or “Not Likely”. The percentage of
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respondents perceiving the likelihood of experiencing consequences for reporting a nonselection for promotion due to race or gender, to any of the department resources is
illustrated in Table 16.
There were no additional consequences or comments listed by respondents that
concerned the reporting of a non-selection or pay-grade advancement due to race or
gender to department options.
Table 15
Respondents’ Likelihood of Impacts for Reporting Disparate Treatment for Work Related
Disability
Impacts:

Not Likely

Likelihoodª

N

%

n

%

n

Alienation/silent treatment

126

50.0

63

50.0

63

Harsh treatment by peers

127

65.4

83

34.6

44

Involuntary transfer

127

60.6

77

39.4

50

Demeaning job tasks

127

66.9

85

33.1

42

“Freeway therapy”

127

80.3

102

19.7

25

Lowered evaluation

126

76.2

96

23.8

30

Demotion or downgrade

127

89.8

114

10.2

13

Satisfactory resolution

129

38.0

49

62.0

80

Reporting Disparate Treatment
Work-related disability

Note. ªCombined Highly Likely and Likely totals.
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Table 16
Respondents’ Likelihood of Impacts for Reporting Non-selection for Promotion or
Advancement
Impacts:

Not Likely

Likelihoodª

N

%

n

%

n

Alienation/silent treatment

129

38.8

50

61;2

79

Harsh treatment by peers

129

49.6

64

50.4

65

Involuntary transfer

129

63.6

82

36.4

47

Demeaning job tasks

129

56.6

73

43.4

56

“Freeway therapy”

129

69.8

90

30.2

39

Lowered evaluation

129

68.2

88

31.8

41

Demotion or downgrade

129

88.4

114

11.6

15

Satisfactory resolution

130

62.3

81

37.7

49

Reporting Non-selection for
Promotion or Advancement

Note. ªCombined Highly Likely and Likely totals.

Reported Misconduct: Gender or Racial Comments at Work
For the reporting of consequences related to being subjected to gender or racial
comments in the workplace, alienation or the silent treatment from co-worker
(72.9%, n = 94) and harsh treatment by co-workers (54.3%, n = 70) were selected with
the highest frequency by respondents. Satisfactory Resolution was selected by 49.6% of
the respondents (n = 64). The percentage of respondents perceiving the likelihood of
experiencing consequences for reporting being subjected to gender or racial comments in
the workplace, to any of the department resources is illustrated in Table 17.
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There was one comment provided by a respondent concerning the impact of
reporting gender or racial comments in the workplace. The respondent indicated that coworkers would hesitate to speak to him or her.
Table 17
Respondents’ Likelihood of Impacts for Reporting Gender and/or Racial Comments at
Work
Impacts:

Not Likely

Likelihoodª

N

%

n

%

n

Alienation/silent treatment

129

27.1

35

72.9

94

Harsh treatment by peers

129

45.7

59

54.3

70

Involuntary transfer

128

49.2

63

50.8

65

Demeaning job tasks

128

54.7

70

45.3

58

“Freeway therapy”

128

68.0

87

32.0

41

Lowered evaluation

128

59.4

76

40.6

52

Demotion or downgrade

128

82.0

105

18.0

23

Satisfactory resolution

129

50.4

65

49.6

64

Reporting Gender and/or
Racial Comments at Work

Note. ªCombined Highly Likely and Likely totals.

Reported Misconduct: Personality Conflict With Supervisor With Negative Impacts
For the reporting of consequences related to having a personality conflict with a
supervisor with negative impacts, alienation or the silent treatment from co-worker
(59.2%, n = 77) and a lowered performance evaluation (55 %, n = 71) were selected
with the highest frequency by respondents. Satisfactory Resolution was selected by
32.3% of the respondents (n = 42). The percentage of respondents perceiving the
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likelihood of experiencing consequences for reporting a personality conflict with a
supervisor with negative impacts is listed in Table 18.
There were 15 comments provided by respondents concerning the impact of
reporting a conflict with a supervisor with negative impact. Respondents indicated
additional impacts as, lost job opportunities, nit-picking of work, belittling, low work
productivity and low job satisfaction, and being forced to transfer. Several respondents
indicated that the negative consequences would only be experienced if the supervisor in
question was well-liked by others in the unit or division.
Table 18
Respondents’ Likelihood of Impacts for Reporting a Conflict with a Supervisor with
Negative Impacts
Impacts:

Not Likely

Likelihoodª

N

%

n

%

n

Alienation/silent treatment

130

40.8

53

59.2

77

Harsh treatment by peers

129

47.3

61

52.7

68

Involuntary transfer

129

48.8

63

51.2

66

Demeaning job tasks

129

45.7

59

54.3

70

“Freeway therapy”

129

64.3

83

35.7

46

Lowered evaluation

129

45.0

58

55.0

71

Demotion or downgrade

128

82.8

106

17.2

22

Satisfactory resolution

130

67.7

88

32.3

42

Reporting a Conflict with a
Supervisor with Negative
Impacts

Note. ªCombined Highly Likely and Likely totals.
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Reported Misconduct: Denied Hardship Change of Watch or Assignment Request Due to
Race or Gender
For the reporting of consequences related to being denied a hardship request due
to race or gender, alienation or the silent treatment from co-worker (55.5%, n = 71) and
harsh treatment by co-workers (45.7%, n = 62) were selected with the highest frequency
by respondents. Satisfactory Resolution was selected by 32.3% (n = 42) of the
respondents. The percentage of respondents perceiving the likelihood of experiencing
consequences for reporting being denied a hardship request due to race or gender is
shown below in Table 19. There were no additional consequences listed by respondents
that concerned the reporting of a denied change of watch or assignment hardship.
Table 19
Respondents’ Likelihood of Impacts for Reporting a Denied Hardship Request due to
Race and/or Gender
Impacts:

Not Likely

Likelihoodª

N

%

n

%

n

Alienation/silent treatment

128

44.5

57

55.5

71

Harsh treatment by peers

128

51.6

66

48.4

62

Involuntary transfer

128

54.7

70

45.3

58

Demeaning job tasks

128

54.7

70

45.3

58

“Freeway therapy”

128

74.2

95

25.8

33

Lowered evaluation

128

68.8

88

31.3

40

Demotion or downgrade

128

94.5

121

5.5

7

Satisfactory resolution

129

57.4

74

42.6

55

Reporting a Denied Hardship
Request (Race/gender)

Note. ªCombined Highly Likely and Likely totals.
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Reported Misconduct: Denied Specialized Training – Race or Gender
For the reporting of consequences related to denied training due to race or gender,
alienation or the silent treatment by peers (59.2%, n = 77) and lowered evaluation
(55.0%, n = 71) were selected by the highest frequency of respondents. Satisfactory
Resolution was selected by 36.4% of the respondents (n = 47). All eight types of
reporting impact have a mode value of 1 or “Not Likely”. The percentage of respondents
perceiving the likelihood of experiencing consequences for reporting allegations of
denied specialized training due to race or gender is listed in Table 20.
Table 20
Respondents’ Likelihood of Impacts for Reporting Denied Specialized Training Due to
Race/Gender
Impacts:

Not Likely

Likelihoodª

N

%

n

%

n

Alienation/silent treatment

129

44.2

57

55.8

72

Harsh treatment by peers

129

54.3

70

45.7

59

Involuntary transfer

128

64.8

83

35.2

45

Demeaning job tasks

128

61.7

79

38.3

49

“Freeway therapy”

128

74.2

95

25.8

33

Lowered evaluation

128

68.8

88

31.3

40

Demotion or downgrade

128

89.8

115

10.2

13

Satisfactory resolution

129

63.6

82

36.4

47

Reporting a Denied
Specialized Training –
Race/gender

Note. ªCombined Highly Likely and Likely totals.

108

There were seven comments provided by respondents concerning the impact of
reporting denied specialized training due to race and/or gender. Respondents added
comments relating to (a) lowered work productivity and (b) being excluded from future
training.
Respondents’ Recommendations for Improvement of Services
There were a total of 75 comments provided by respondents for improving the
current services provided to employees who are reporting specific misconduct
allegations. A large number of responses involve the needed review of current LAPD
processes with respect to the reporting and investigation of misconduct complaints.
Respondents recommended, an anonymous and confidential reporting system should be
designed, that the reporting process be transparent and known to all employees and
designed in a manner that allows the name of the reporting employee to be held in strict
confidentiality and not be disclosed.
Another process that was recommended was to remove the investigating function
for the investigation of internal complaints of discrimination or harassment away from
the confines of the department’s Internal Affairs Division. Diversifying command staff
and supervisory positions was also identified as a means for removing racial and other
discriminatory practices from within the ranks of the organization. Eight responses
specifically involved the enhancement of management accountability. Several
respondents commented that commanding officers should be held to a higher standard of
accountability for the work environment and for providing their subordinate supervisors
with the trust and authority to make decisions. Several respondents commented that the
double standard of the administration of discipline between management and non-
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management personnel causes polarity within the organization that lends itself to mistrust
and under-reporting of misconduct.
Enhanced training was another category that drew a number of responses for
improving current resource options for personnel. Respondents indicated that there was a
dire need for supervisors to become more aware of how to manage complaints of
discrimination, harassment and disability medical restrictions. Respondents
recommended that the department should design a resource web-page and confidential
“hotline” for employees who need assistance with discrimination and harassment without
going through formal investigative channels. One respondent commented:
Threatening employees with retaliation is effective but causes more fear. The
process is laced with fear, embarrassment and uncertainty which causes underreporting and undermines the process when reported. The culture does not want
to accept that these problems exist. We need more encouragement, trust and
accountability for one’s actions to change this environment. (R71)
Several respondents suggested that getting the word out about the least known
resources would help remove the mystery of what each resource function does and the
uncertainty of how to get appropriate help. Respondents additionally commented that
improved training outside of an E-learning atmosphere where group discussions can take
place would bring more of the issues out into the open.
Additional Comments by Respondents
There were 18 additional comments from respondents who described their
perception of the organization, supervision and how reporting parties to misconduct are
perceived. Several respondents indicated that they perceive commanding officers as
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being sophisticated enough to document adverse work performance so as not to appear
like retaliation when the action is, in fact, retaliatory. Many respondents perceive those
who report misconduct as whiners or babies that use the system to get the promotions or
assignments they do not deserve or to not work hard to achieve. Several respondents
perceive the department as having a ‘who you know not what you know’ type of
bureaucracy where supervisors should be expected to set the tone and act professional
whether a complaint is viable or not. Many respondents indicated that this was not the
common case, however.
Several respondents recommended that employees seek assistance outside of the
department for better assistance because of the lack of care taken by the department in
managing complaints of peer wrongdoing. Others recommended that the department do a
better job of educating employees about how to prepare themselves for promotion so that
gender and racial bias does not continue to be an excuse for those who are unprepared for
promotion. Several respondents opined that the department does less internal
investigating of discrimination allegations because they are not trained well enough to
manage the investigations without bias.
Summary of Findings
The data showed that department employees would most likely report any one of
the eight most commonly reported types of employee misconduct listed in the survey
instrument through the use of the LAPD’s established chain of command (supervisor and
above). The eight specific types of misconduct listed on the survey instrument included:
sexual harassment, hostile work environment, disparate treatment due to a work-related
disability, non-selection for promotion or pay-grade because of gender or racial bias,
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gender and/or racial comments heard in the workplace, conflict with supervisor, being
denied a hardship change of watch or assignment due to race or gender, and being
denied specialized training due to race or gender. Despite the varied specialized
resources in place to manage misconduct on the LAPD, respondents indicated that the
misconduct reporting avenues of Supervisor, below the rank of captain and Command or
Staff Officer were both viable resource options for all eight types of misconduct.
The next most frequently selected resources were Internal Affairs Group and
Employee Relations Section. The data showed that employees would likely report
misconduct allegations related to sexual harassment, hostile-offensive or intimidating
work environment, gender and/or racial comments at work, conflict with a supervisor,
and being denied specialized training, within their chain of command and to Internal
Affairs Group. For the reporting of misconduct allegations related to disparate treatment
for work-related disabilities, non-selection for promotion or pay-grade advancement due
to race and/or gender, and denial of hardship change of watch or assignment request due
to race and/or gender, respondents indicated they would likely utilize their chain of
command and Employee Relations Group. The resource option that would likely be the
least utilized (over 60%) for the reporting of these specific allegations of misconduct was
reported to be Behavioral Science Services and Office of the Inspector General.
The survey instrument contained eight types of impact commonly reported by
employees for reporting misconduct. These impacts are: alienation or silent treatment,
harsh treatment by peers, involuntary transfer, demeaning job assignments, “freeway
therapy” (assigned far from home), lowered performance evaluations, demotion or
downgrade, and satisfactory resolution. The data showed that respondents reported the

112

highest frequency of real and/or perceived impacts (demeaning job assignment, “freeway
therapy”, lowered performance evaluation, demotion or downgrade, harsh treatment by
peers, and involuntary transfer) for reporting two specific types of misconduct (conflict
with a supervisor, and denied hardship change of watch or assignment request).
Over 70% of the respondents believed they would be subject to harsh treatment
by peers and alienation for reporting sexual harassment and a hostile work environment.
Over 55% of the respondents indicated real or perceived negative impacts of alienation,
lowered evaluation, and demeaning work would be the result of reporting a conflict with
a supervisor.
In terms of receiving a satisfactory resolution for the reporting of all eight types
of misconduct, an average of 75% of the respondents indicated that they would not likely
receive a satisfactory resolution to their report of misconduct. Respondents indicated that
reporting of disparate treatment due to work-related disability (62%) and sexual
harassment (53%) would result in the highest positive outcomes. The two types of
misconduct that would result in the lowest perception or unlikelihood of a positive
outcome reported by respondents were non-selection for promotion or pay grade
advancement (62%), and reporting a conflict with a supervisor (67%).
Respondents provided comments as to why particular resources would unlikely be
utilized. There were a total of 79 written responses provided by participants that
addressed why particular resources would not be utilized. Individual reasons included
fear of retaliation, preferences for an alternate resource, lack of confidence in a successful
outcome, and preference to self-manage the issue without intervention. Organizational
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reasons included a preference for utilizing the organization’s chain of command, an
entity’s lack of or poorly designed investigative role.
Seventy-five respondents provided comments and suggestions for improving the
current resource options for LAPD employees. Recommendations from respondents
included a combination of the following: (a) the necessity for enhanced communication
channels between management and line officers, (b) improved training at all levels but
particularly among the supervisory ranks, and (c) improved processes for the reporting
and investigation of internal discrimination complaints. Additionally, the design of an
alternative reporting resource or one-stop shop for the reporting and investigating of all
discrimination complaints with outside department oversight was commented upon
frequently by respondents. A one-stop resource for these types of complaints would
lessen the confusion of having multiple resource options, enhance department
compliance with employment laws, and improve accountability for creating and
maintaining a professional work environment that encourages misconduct reporting for
these types of misconduct violations.
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CHAPTER V: CONCLUSION
The primary purpose of this study was to explore the act and impact of whistleblowing by police officers who report acts of organizational wrong-doing within the Los
Angeles Police Department (LAPD). A close examination as to why police officers
continue to file claims outside of the organization while a myriad of internal resolution
avenues are provided for employees and how the organization responds to reported
workplace wrong-doing was conducted to determine the gravity and scope of the issues
involved within the LAPD. It is believed that where evidence of dysfunction exist
recommendations for changes or enhancement of current services can be made.
Police, fire and military professions are very unique in that they each “possess an
unparalleled need for loyalty, solidarity, and protection (Kingshott et al., 2004; Rothwell
& Baldwin, 2007) given that they can be in a life threatening situation on any given day
whether they work in a plain clothes assignment or when working a uniformed patrol
function. The fear of being isolated from other co-workers, losing promotional
opportunities or career suicide are two of several significant causes for conscious and
maybe even unconscious silencing by police officers who witness or experience
organizational wrongdoing. Rather than viewing the whistle-blower as being a
“malcontent” with self-serving motives, whistle-blowers can be seen as “part of a
strategy to maintain and improve quality” (Lewis, 1997, p. 5). Failure on the part of any
organization to protect whistle-blowers from retaliation or retribution after they report
organizational or peer misconduct has far reaching affects to the individual and to the
organization.
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To explore the affects of reporting wrong-doing within the LAPD, a selfadministered survey instrument was distributed to a sample of full-time sworn police
officers of the LAPD in 2009. Survey participants were randomly selected from within
the ranks of Police Officer, Detective, Sergeant, Lieutenant, Captain, and Commander.
The survey instrument contained 17 questions designed to capture the likelihood of
participants reporting eight specifically chosen types of misconduct to eight
organizational resource entities available for the reporting of misconduct allegations
made by employees of the LAPD. Data was collected from 131 survey participants.
Research Findings
The data analysis showed that police officers employed by the LAPD perceive the
act of whistle-blowing and the subsequent impact of whistle-blowing as a negative
process and experience. The data showed that regardless of these reported real and
perceived negative consequences of reporting organizational misconduct to LAPD
internal resources, a large number of police officer employees would prefer to report
specific types of misconduct through their chain of command as opposed to using
specialized resources. Police officers who reported that they would not likely utilize
specific organizational internal resources cited the fear of retaliation, lack of faith in a
satisfactory complaint resolution, and an unspoken code of silence, as the main reasons
for non-disclosure.
Recommendations were provided by officers for improving current internal
resource options. Some of these recommendations included the need for continuous
training, particularly for supervisors, in workplace harassment and discrimination, a
review and re-design of organizational processes and enhanced accountability for
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command and staff officers for ensuring that reported issues and concerns are swiftly and
properly addressed without the fear of retribution. The key findings and discussion of
what these findings may represent are discussed from the perspective of four research
questions.
Research Question 1:
What is the Reported Likelihood of Using Each of the Established
Internal Misconduct Reporting Resources Based on Specific Misconduct Allegations?
The reported likelihood of using each of the established internal misconduct
reporting resources varied among the resources and misconduct type. Supervisors below
the rank of Captain were selected by the highest number of respondents for the reporting
of Gender or racial comments in the workplace (84%), and disparate treatment due to a
work-related disability (75%). The likelihood of reporting misconduct to Command or
Staff Officers closely mirrored that of Supervisors. Over 65% of the respondents
indicated that they would report any of the eight types of misconduct types to Command
or Staff Officers. Over 73% indicated that they would report conflicts with supervisors
and Command level personnel.
Internal Affairs Group had a likelihood reporting average of over 40% for seven
out of eight types of misconduct. Over 67% of the respondents indicated that they would
report gender and racial comments to this resource. Over 50% of the respondents
reported the likelihood of contacting Employee Relations Section for all eight types of
misconduct types.
The likelihood of using Work Environment Liaison Section, Office of the
Inspector General and the Retaliation Prevention Unit were significantly low (under
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40%) for reporting any of the eight misconduct types. Comments provided by
respondents indicated that these were the least known resources of the eight. Behavioral
Science Services ranked the lowest of likely use by the vast majority of respondents
(21%). Comments provided by respondents ranged from resignation to distrust.
Research Question 2:
Are There Differences in the Reported Likelihood of Using Internal
Misconduct Reporting Resources Based on any Specific Acts of Employee Misconduct?
The reported likelihood of using the eight established employee resources
commonly used for the reporting of employee misconduct averaged slightly fewer than
60% for reporting four out of eight specific acts of employee misconduct: Sexual
harassment, Hostile/offensive, or intimidating work environment, gender/racial
comments in the workplace, and disparate treatment due to a work-related disability. Of
the eight resources, respondents reported a more than 69% likelihood of reporting all
eight misconduct types to a Supervisor and/or a Command or Staff officer; ranks or civil
service classifications that fall within an employee’s chain of command.
Internal Affairs Group was the third most selected resource by over 60% of the
respondents for the reporting of sexual harassment, hostile/offensive, or intimidating
work environment and gender/racial comments in the workplace. The least likely
resources to be utilized for reporting any of the eight misconduct types were the Office of
the Inspector general, Work Environment Liaison Division, and Behavioral Science
Services.
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Research Question 3:
What are the Expressed Reasons Given for any Misconduct Reporting Resources
That are “Not Likely” to be Used for Reporting Specific Acts of Employee Misconduct?
Of the less than 40% of the officers who would not use their chain of command,
reasons provided ranged from a lack of confidence in particular supervisors or members
of their command staff due to past experiences of peer or supervisory hostility to outright
mismanagement of their reported complaint. One respondent wrote, “I talked to a staff
officer about a problem before. The solution turned out to be worse than the problem"
(R64). Many officers also cited the need for enhanced supervisory training in the
management of work related discrimination complaints.
Comments related to the use of Internal Affairs Group drew some of the most
direct and openly hostile comments by officers, although many would reportedly contact
this resource for incidents related to sexual harassment and hostile work environment
issues. Comments from respondents ranged from a lack of overall confidence in a
successful outcome of their complaint, fear of retaliation and a lack of trust in how
investigations are conducted. One respondent wrote "I have felt retaliation for reporting
misconduct in the past from the accused and the investigating officer at Internal Affairs"
(R81).
The resource options of the Work Environment Liaison Division, Office of the
Inspector General, and the Retaliation Prevention Unit, received similar comments with
respect to the reporting of most of the eight types of misconduct. Respondents indicated
a general lack of trust felt by officers who are not aware of what these entities actually
do. Of those who knew of the resource’s particular function, several respondents
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commented on the non-investigatory function of the unit as a reason why they would not
utilize these resources.
Behavioral Science Services drew the highest number of comments from
respondents. Comments included a lack of confidence in a successful outcome or ability
to help resolve the issue at hand, and preference to self-manage the issue without internal
psychological intervention. A number of officers indicted that they would prefer to seek
assistance from outside psychologists rather than use the department resource.
Research Question 4:
What are the Perceived Consequences of Participating in the Whistle-Blowing Process?
As stated earlier, Police, fire and military professions are very unique in that they
each “possess an unparalleled need for loyalty, solidarity, and protection (Kingshott et al.,
2004; Rothwell & Baldwin, 2007). This being said, the fears associated with reporting
peer misconduct are as real as the acts themselves. The reporting of gender and/or racial
workplace comments, sexual harassment, and a hostile/offensive or intimidating work
environment was reported as attracting the highest likelihood of negative impact. Over
72% of the respondents indicated they would be subjected to alienation or silent
treatment from their peers after reporting these acts to any of the internal resources.
These acts of misconduct were also reported by respondents (over 74%) as the most
likely types of misconduct to be reported to supervisors and commanding officers.
Slightly fewer than 50% of the respondents reported the real or perceived fear of
receiving an involuntary transfer of assignment for reporting gender or racial comments
at work, sexual harassment, hostile/offensive or intimidating work environment. Of the
eight types of misconduct, sexual harassment and disparate treatment due to having a
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work-related disability were perceived to yield the most satisfactory results if reported to
the department. Although there were a large percentage of respondents who perceived
these consequences, these perceptions had minimal effect on the number of those who
would actually report specific types of misconduct.
Conclusions
This study sought to examine the act and impact of police officers who report peer
wrong-doing or specific types of misconduct through the use of internal resource options.
The following conclusions were drawn from this study:
Conclusion 1:
The LAPD Culture Inhibits the Internal
Reporting of Specific Types of Organizational Misconduct
This study revealed that over 40% of the officers who completed the survey
instrument believed that there would be one or more negative impacts of reporting
certain types of misconduct through department channels and over 50% would not
utilize the majority of specialized departmental entities in place for assisting in the
resolution of these types of complaints. Officers cited a myriad of reasons as to why
they believed reporting through department channels was futile. Many believed that the
reporting process and reporting resource options yielded insufficient resolution options.
Others believed that the LAPD culture was far too rigid to change what is believed to be
a culture shrouded in secrecy, silence and the sequestering of peer wrongdoing.
Additionally, between the years 2004 and 2009, a number of civil lawsuits filed
by sworn police officers of the LAPD have resulted in significantly high plaintiff
awards. An analysis of these lawsuits indicates that employees who had attempted to
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report specific types of organizational misconduct through the use of internal resources
were met with less than favorable outcomes.
Conclusion 2:
The Existence of Multiple Internal Whistle-Blower Resource Options
Inhibits Rather Than Supports the Internal Disclosure of Organizational Wrongdoing.
The LAPD has in excess of eight internal resource options for the reporting of
specific types of organizational misconduct. These entities offer LAPD employees a
number of resource options for resolving complaints of a serious or minor nature. For
example employees may opt to confidentially report to department psychologists who
have the power and authority to restrict access to most information disclosed by the
employee with the exception of disclosing acts that may cause physical harm to the
reporting individual or others. However, this study showed that over 80% of the
employees surveyed would not use this resource. Employees may also opt to initiate
formal grievances, cause formal complaint investigations to be initiated, arrange for
informal mediation procedures, or seek to initiate formal or informal counseling sessions
for affected employees.
These options are in place to resolve any act committed by a department
employee that may violate standard operating procedures. However, this study showed
that the number of employees utilizing these resources ranged from a low 17% to 50%.
This fluctuation in distribution may be indicative of the large number of employees who
were unsure of where to seek resolution options. Many employees commented that the
high number of resources caused overwhelm and confusion when deciding where to
seek the best resource option.
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Conclusion 3:
A Rigid Reporting System for the Reporting of
Organizational Misconduct and Inconclusive Investigations
Inhibit Employees From Utilizing the Internal Reporting Process
The LAPD mandates that any employee who becomes aware of misconduct shall
immediately report the misconduct to a department supervisor or be subjected to an
allegation of misconduct for failing to report the misconduct in a timely manner. This
study showed that regardless of the mandatory reporting process there was evidence of
conflicting choices about where, how and when to report specific types of misconduct.
Hostile work environment complaints are difficult to place reporting limitations upon
when the degree of offensiveness varies from person to person. With these types of
issues, internal investigations have the tendency to end up focusing more on the
complainant’s failure to report the conduct in a timely manner rather than focus on the
misconduct being reported. Civil lawsuits filed by police officers employed by the
LAPD also demonstrate that the confidence of resolving misconduct complaints often fall
short of a satisfactory resolution due to lengthy investigations, unknown disciplinary
actions due to confidentiality provisions and limited protection for the whistle-blower.
Additionally, internal investigations that are inconclusive fail to remedy the behavior
being reported and all involved employees are faced with remaining in an environment
that may be hostile or offensive for one or more employees. One respondent cited his or
her reason for not reporting misconduct though the use of departmental resources as
follows:
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Threatening employees is effective but causes more fear. The process is laced
with fear, embarrassment and uncertainty which causes under-reporting and
undermines the process when reported. The culture does not want to accept that
these problems exist. We need more encouragement, trust and accountability for
one’s actions to change this environment. (R71)
Conclusion 4:
Administrative Oversight (e.g., Internal Affairs Investigative
Complaint Process) for the Management of Reportable Employment
Discrimination is a Source of Loose Compliance or Non-Compliance
of Federal, State, and City Employment Discrimination Laws and Regulations.
Employment discrimination is investigated by the LAPD as an act of
organizational misconduct rather than a violation of federal, and city laws. Investigations
involving reported discrimination are often closed as “Unresolved” when there are no
witnesses to the conduct and the investigation falls short of evidence needed to hold
anyone accountable for the conduct. An “Unresolved” investigation does not stop the
reported behavior and often results in organizational non-compliance of the law by failing
to maintain a work environment free of discriminatory conduct where the reporting
employee feels unsupported and unprotected by the organization.
Many officers cited experiences of retaliation that followed reports of misconduct
that mirrored race and/or gender discrimination. Several commented on real or perceived
acts of retaliation that were expressed by those investigating the very acts that were being
reported. Others strongly recommended that an in-house one-stop investigatory resource
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outside of departmental control would encourage internal misconduct reporting and
lessen the need for external reporting.
Implications for the LAPD
The high number of officers who reported the likelihood (over 70%) of reporting
specific types of misconduct or peer wrongdoing to a member of their chain of command
for any of the eight types listed, was a significant finding. On one hand, this finding may
be used by command staff to recognize the need to use this influence to recognize the
need to train and empower their subordinate supervisors in managing employee versus
employee workplace gender and/or racially motivated conflicts swiftly and appropriately.
This enhanced level of service in managing these employee issues would ensure
compliance with Federal, State, City laws and other codified regulations for the proper
management of employee discrimination. This level of the organization may be the most
influential arm of the LAPD in beginning the process of needed change in how whistleblowing is viewed, interpreted and managed by command staff and frontline supervisors.
Implications for Practice
The present study contributes to the body of whistle-blowing literature by
examining the act and impact of reporting organizational misconduct within a large
municipal police agency with multiple reporting resource options. Previous whistleblowing literature has not explored the area of whistle-blowing from the perspective of
police officers within one municipal police department, nor has whistle-blowing literature
explored the impact that whistle-blowing has on police officers who have a myriad of
internal resource options.
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The present study demonstrates that having strict reporting control measures that
demand the immediate reporting of organizational wrongdoing by employees (or be
subjected to disciplinary action) and having numerous internal reporting resources is not
enough to encourage internal whistle-blowing, nor does it protect the whistle-blower
from any real or perceived fears associated with misconduct reporting. Studies show that
both internal and external whistle-blowers tend to view their organizations as
unsupportive and having less than effective avenues for resolving complaints of wrongdoing (Miceli, Van Scotter, Near, & Rehg, 2001). This present study contributes to these
previous whistle-blowing studies. These findings showed that multiple number resource
options and rigid misconduct reporting mandates are less than adequate to encourage the
internal reporting of organizational wrongdoing. This study adds to current whistleblowing research as few studies examine whistle-blowing from an organization’s ability
to self-regulate reported wrongdoing with multiple resource options.
The LAPD may be the only municipal policing agency to be studied for the
impact of reporting misconduct to an excess of eight internal resource options. This
study outlines the importance of open and transparent lines of communication between
available multiple resource options, management, and employee-whistle-blowers.
Organizations with centralized structures have demonstrated their attempt to
accommodate whistle-blowers by creating a decentralized style of management.
A decentralized management style provides managers with flexibility in decision-making
for resolving reported wrong-doing without involving upper management. This type of
style is said to encourage internal whistle-blowing (Andrews, 2006). The high number of
respondents who would report wrongdoing to their chain of command (over 70%)
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supports past research, however, negative mindsets that dismiss whistle-blowing, can also
create a culture that contributes to external whistle-blowing.
Recommendations
The following recommendations focus on creating and maintaining a work
environment that encourages whistle-blowing as an act of loyalty to the profession and
commitment to the continuous improvement of services provided to employees while
decreasing the fear of organizational cannibalism. These recommendations are based on
the collected survey data:
1. A risk management triage team made up of specially trained sworn and civilian
supervisors and managers should convene on a regular (quarterly) basis to address
issues and resolution options for complaints of employment discrimination,
harassment and discrimination
2. LAPD managers and supervisors should receive mandated classroom training in
conflict resolution, mediation techniques, and employment laws on a yearly basis
3. An audit of current LAPD resource options should be conducted to ensure
compliance with City, State, and Federal employment discrimination laws
pertaining to the investigation of reported complaints and maintaining a
discrimination-free workplace
4. Design a “Code of Conduct” to be distributed to all employees that is enforced at
all levels of the organization
5. Department recognized employee resources must have a confidential “right to
know, need to know” open door policy that allows for confidential networking
and transparency of information among each of the resources
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6. Create a clearly defined reporting structure for employees that describe the
functions of all specialized reporting avenues to remove the fear and uncertainty
associated with unfamiliar resources.
Methodological Limitations and Internal Validity
Methodological Limitations
The response rate for the survey was considerably less than what had been hoped
for. With only 18% responding, questions regarding the ability to create a “safe”
environment for officers to share their beliefs and experiences for these highly sensitive
issues continue along with the speculations that the high number of recently closed
lawsuits and the increasing number of pending lawsuits may have influenced those who
chose not to participate. There were a number of officers who returned surveys with
handwritten “no thanks!” or other statements regarding the inability to change the culture
of LAPD. Nevertheless, since valid sampling methods were used, these 131 officers’
views are representative of the LAPD though not all views of the 8300 workforce are
included. This impacts the external validity and recommendations must be made with
some level of caution.
Ensuring Internal Validity of Interpreted Data
Careful and deliberate multiple reviews of the qualitative data following
Creswell’s (2003) strategies supported internal validity. This process involved the
selection of a second researcher. In order to ensure reliable interpretation of the
qualitative data, the coded data was reviewed in depth by a peer examiner experienced in
textual analysis. Coding results were discussed and included extensive discussions
regarding any identifiable conclusions or possible misinterpretations. The coding process
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continued until consensus was obtained. Several areas presented challenging
considerations; these involved the determination of relationships among comments that
did not comply with instructions given to survey participants, and ensuring researcher
objectivity. As a law enforcement officer employed by the organization being surveyed it
was critically important to be self-aware and to be able to acknowledge when personal
assumptions or bias may possibly interfere with the coding or interpretation of comments.
One way to deter this from occurring was to engage in frequent dialogue with the coreviewer about emerging patterns until a consensus was received.
Suggestions for Future Research
Although much was learned from this study, there is much to be learned about the
act and impact of whistle-blowing within a closed, rigid, command and control
organizational setting. Researchers interested in studying the act and impact of police
whistle-blowing could consider studying the effects of whistle-blowing from the
perspectives of both civilian and sworn personnel within the policing profession. By
studying varied sub-cultures within a given organization or profession, it may be possible
to gain more comprehensive data resulting in greater insight into the influence of peer
and organizational retaliation on the whistle-blowing process.
Closing Remarks
I am a 29-year veteran of the LAPD. I feel fortunate to have been given the
opportunity to conduct this study after 29 years as a sworn police officer for the LAPD,
and after having worked at one or more of the resource options listed in the survey. My
tenure as an LAPD officer and investigating detective came full circle during this study.
I began my career interviewing potential victims of employee harassment and enter the

129

last few years of active duty interviewing potential victims of workplace retaliation.
Much has changed over the years on the LAPD in terms of the rising level of interest in
recognizing where cultural change is necessary and doable without waiting for the next
court finding. During this year-long journey I gained additional insight into the largely
unknown and often questioned motives of the police officer as organizational whistleblower. I spent 14 years as the LAPD’s Sexual Harassment Counselor and I have
interviewed or participated in the interviewing of hundreds of department sworn and
civilian employees with respect to complaints of harassment, work discrimination, and
retaliation. I currently supervise a newly formed unit that oversees adverse actions taken
against employees involved in lawsuits, grievances and formal personnel complaints in
hopes of lessening the rising plaintiff awards, and in time, preventing real or perceived
acts of retaliation.
During my tenure with working three of the eight employee resources I learned
that sometimes bad people bring bad circumstances and experiences onto themselves.
And, other times, bad things happen to the undeserving. That is a significant lesson for
me because it keeps me grounded after listening to the stories of those who feel betrayed
by their co-workers, friends and supervisors when their heartfelt complaint goes
unresolved or unattended to. The LAPD has been under close scrutiny by the Federal
courts since 1979. Sadly, it took three court imposed consent decrees and a growing
number of civil lawsuits for the LAPD to move beyond age-old rigid mindsets and an
antiquated discipline system to demand compliance to its policies and procedures. The
policies are not working to control behavior. Rigid command and control of reporting
mandates do not work to control the reporting of wrongdoing (Barnett, Cochran, &
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Taylor, 1993, Bather & Kelly, 2005). Specialized units impose self-regulated
confidentiality policies that do not allow for a free information exchange, or triaging of
resolution strategies between the sections or units. Complaints are often being
investigated by one or more resource options leading to duplicated efforts with weak or
ineffective resolution options.
Written policies are not enough to change mindsets, as demonstrated by the
growing number of police civil lawsuits. I heard it once said that the problem with the
LAPD’s police force is that the City Personnel Department recruits from the human race.
As such, differences are expressed, rights are defended, misconduct allegations generate
stronger control mechanisms, justice is gained by filing civil lawsuits, and the hamster
moves with no destination in mind. It takes strong leadership to set the tone of
professional conduct. As long as gallows humor exists among police officers to describe
the misfortunes of one another and the citizens they serve, as long as a written code of
conduct fails to exist or hold employees accountable for, as long as managers continue to
blindly endorse discipline up the chain of command without an independent and objective
viewpoint, and as long as the person at the top fails to address the cries of help from
within, organizational discrimination followed by the personal vindication of civil
lawsuits and large plaintiff awards will continue to rise.
The majority of officers I have met, worked with, counseled, or interviewed have
one thing in common. Some managers and supervisors are quick to label whistle-blowers
as lazy malcontents who use the system for personal gain and personal vendettas. There
are managers and supervisors who flippantly interpret the external reporting of
misconduct as an act of disloyalty or worse, an act of organizational terrorism. And, in
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the midst of these negative mindsets about the external reporting of misconduct
violations, over 70% of the respondents in this study reported that middle management
and command leaders would be their initial reporting avenue for allegations of
misconduct. Negative mindsets breed contempt and inaction by those with the most
power and influence to correct behavior and effect needed change to a culture that is
feeding on itself.
In my personal experience with reports of internal workplace harassment
however, I have found that many of our organizational whistle-blowers are seasoned
police officers who came into this line of work for all the right reasons; to protect and
serve others. With many officers, there is a belief that they, as police officers should be
protected from harm from within and served by the organization when violations are
reported. Loyalty is a two-way street. I recently met with an officer who is the main
plaintiff in a lawsuit involving over 2000 LAPD officers that was recently settled for a
large figure. I saw the tears in his eyes when he described sacrificing his time with his
family to work long hours without one blemish to his record. And when he attempted to
report act of perceived retaliation, he was unable to get satisfactory assistance to stop the
reported conduct. He decided to “fight back” by having his day in court. When I asked if
he was ready to retire soon, he responded, “what for? I love this job…that’s the one
thing they can’t take from me.” That was my paradigm shift. For a moment, I felt the act
and impact of whistle-blowing from his perspective: a gut wrenching feeling of
disappointment mixed with anger for the senselessness behind it all.
The effects of whistle-blowing can remain with the individual whistle-blower or
it can infiltrate into a small squad or unit at the blink of an eye lowering morale,
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productivity and organizational pride. Minimizing the risk of liability from retaliation
and discrimination lawsuits in both public and private industries can be minimized with a
(a) proactive approach by management that encourages and commends whistle-blowing
by employees, (b) the establishment of well-defined protection policies that project a zero
tolerance for retaliation against any employee who brings forward reports of
organizational wrongdoing, (c) a clearly defined process for reporting organizational
wrongdoing that is a confidential and supportive means for resolving complaints and
concerns, (d) the development of appropriate training programs for managers and
supervisors for the no-nonsense management and investigation of employment
discrimination complaints, and (e) a strong disciplinary approach to manage those who
violate employment discrimination laws and policies and to hold managers strictly
accountable for their diligence in resolving workplace issues within their respective
assignments and commands.
In this study an attempt was made to determine the cause and effect of whistleblowing and the influence that departmental internal entities have on the reporting
process. I have met my initial objectives for contributing to the whistle-blowing body of
knowledge by demonstrating how multiple resource options and rigid misconductreporting policies fail to encourage internal whistle-blowing. And, I have offered
recommendations for the enhancement of services offered to the men and women of the
LAPD. This study only touches the surface of the work that is still needed to be done in
the examination of paramilitary work life and its influence on organizational behavior.
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